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GAINING SOME PERSPECTIVE IN TORT LAW:
A NEW TAKE ON THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL ATTACK CASES
by
Martha Chamallas*
Despite the prominence of the objective "reasonable person standard" in
tort doctrine, it is a mistake to conclude that perspective has no place in
contemporary tort law. Although explicit perspectival standards, such as
the "reasonable woman standard, " have gained little acceptance in torts,
the perspectives and experiences of non-dominant social groups have
sometimes been taken into account in key contexts that involve
"culturally polarized understandings of fact" and differing judgments
about what constitutes reasonably safe behavior. Notably, the battle has
not been over precise formulations of the duty to exercise reasonable care,
but over whether to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care in the first
instance.
This Article examines third-party criminal attack claims against
landlords, businesses, emplcoyers, and other entities charged with
negligence for failing to detect and remedy dangerous conditions and
prevent sexual assaults and other criminal attacks on their premises. The
victims in these cases are often women, racial minorities, and low-income
residents of high-crime areas. The Article describes the lack of consensus
in the courts as to whether defendants owe a duty to take reasonable
measures to guard against crime and analyzes the recent position taken
by the Restatement (Third) of Torts in favor of imposing a duty in all
but exceptional cases. The Article endorses the willingness of some courts
in sexual assault cases to impose a duty and articulate a concept of
reasonable care that requires defendants to make their premises equally
safe for men and women. It criticizes the line of cases which rejects a duty
of due care in high-crime areas, excuses defendants from taking
precautions proportionate to the risk, and thereby fails to express a norm
of equal safety regardless of where a person resides.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The "objective" reasonable person standard (RPS) is a staple of tort
law most frequently associated with negligence liability. It continues to be
featured prominently in the new Restatement (Third) of Torts,' the
influential document that attempts to describe the rules and principles
that courts in the 50 states apply in tort cases . A superficial glance at the
Restatement (Third) would suggest that little has changed since the
"reasonable man" morphed into the "reasonable person" somewhere
along the journey from the Restatement (Second) (adopted in 1965) to the
new version (adopted in 2005). Although the Restatement (Third) rejects
the old sexist terminology that had rendered women invisible by
presuming that "man" was a universal term, there is no discussion in the
new document of the reasons for this change in terminology, suggesting
that it is merely cosmetic and inconsequential.
Even more significant, the "black letter" Restatement rules covering
the meaning of the RPS continue to adhere to the "objective" RPS, with
only a few well-established, narrow exceptions. The standard still
envisions a non-situated reasonable person who has no discernible
gender, race, or other marker of personal identity that might influence
that person's perception or viewpoint. In this respect, the Restatement
mirrors the contemporary case law which has shown little inclination to
adopt explicitly modified standards-such as the "reasonable woman
standard"-to assure that the perspectives and experiences of non-
dominant social groups are reflected in the law. Despite the longstanding
critique of objectivity offered by critical scholars in a variety of
disciplines3 and the limited acceptance of perspectival standards in
statutory civil rights law,4 tort law has clung to the objective RPS, at least
at the level of formal doctrine.
'See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSIcAL HARM § 3 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2 Throughout this Article, I will refer to the principles of the Restatement (Third)
as representative of the dominant position in tort law. We must bear in mind,
however, that the tort laws of the 50 states are quite diverse in character and that, on
any given doctrinal point, the Restatement inevitably fails to capture the complexity of
contemporary law.
See infra notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
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However, when we look beneath the Surface a bit, we can see that
tort law sometimes incorporates diverse perspectives and experiences, if
only in certain contexts and in some jurisdictions. Interestingly, the
battleground has not been over the precise formulation of the duty of
reasonable care, but rather tends to play out in heated struggles over
whether to impose a duty to take reasonable care in the first instance.
Elsewhere, I have written about the importance of duty in cases of
emotional distress alleging workplace sexual and racial harassment, and
in emotional distress cases involving sexual exploitation and reproductive
harm, contexts in which some courts are willing to liberalize duty rules to
provide greater protection 5for gender-related harms that
disproportionately affect women . This Article focuses on duty in physical
harm cases, highlighting negligence claims for injury arising from sexual
assaults and criminal attacks, and their implications for gender and racial
equality. As in the emotional distress cases, the doctrine in this area is
very unstable, with many courts continuing to apply restrictive no-duty
rules to deny recovery.t ' Not surprisingly, the Restatement (Third) generally
takes no position on these contested matters but has approved carefully
drafted provisions which allow courts to go either way.'
This Article begins with a brief review of the Restatement (Third)
provisions on the RPS as they pertain to claims for physical harm." Like
its predecessors, the new Restatement (Third) draws a sharp distinction
between physical and emotional harm, providing a separate set of rules
for the latter. Moreover, in discussions of the RPS in tort law, the focus
usually immediately turns to how the RPS is applied in negligence cases
involving physical injury, even though the concept of reasonableness
(and the RPS) is pervasive throughout tort law. This preoccupation with
physical harm creates the misimpression that perspective, social position,
and differing life experiences are not relevant to assessments of
reasonableness. Indeed, the specific Restatement (Third) provisions
governing physical harm discussed in Part 11 endorse a modification of
the RPS in only two limited instances: with respect to children and
persons with physical disabilities. 9 From these provisions, the take-home
message is that the strict, objective RPS should apply absent clear proof
of a difference in the abilities or capacities of the affected groups to
which the tort litigant belongs.
5See Martha Chamallas, Unpacking Emotional Distress: Sexual Exploitation,
Reproductive Harm, and Fundamental Rights, 44 WAKE FOREST L. Rrv. 1109 (2009)
(discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress); Martha Chamallas,
Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 2115 (2007) (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress). See also
MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER,
AN DTORT L~' 89-117 (2010) (discussing element of duty).
"See infra notes 127-83 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text.
9See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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In Part 111, this Article pivots to provide a brief general description of
the interdisciplinary research on multiple perspectives and perspectival
standards and discusses some of the reasons fre Vuently put forward for
criticizing standards that purport to be objective. In this Part, I explain
that a move to substitute an explicitly gender-based or race-based
standard for the RPS has never gained much traction in tort law,
although there has been some thoughtful discussion of the topic in the
scholarly literature." In this respect, tort law's reluctance to move away
from the RPS standard is even more pronounced than it is in statutory
civil rights law, where perspectival standards have gained some currency
in hostile environment claims alleging racial and sexual haasmn.
The heart of the Article (Part IV) explores a controversial subset of
physical harm cases-third-party tort claims brought by rape victims and
other victims of criminal attacks-in which the perspective or social
position of a party has emerged as highly relevant, although courts are
far from uniform in recognizing that perspective matters in these
settings. Most often framed in highly abstract terms as a debate over
whether a party owes a duty of reasonable care, these cases nevertheless
require courts to make concrete decisions about whether to provide a
remedy for gender- and race-linked harms, and sometimes subtly turn on
considerations of gender, race, and economic status.'13 In these third-
party attack cases, plaintiffs press negligence claims against landlords,
businesses, employers, and other entities for failing to detect and remedy
dangerous conditions or otherwise failing to take reasonable precautions
to prevent the attacks. Currently, there is no consensus among courts, or
even a clear trend of decisions, on the crucial issue of whether
defendants owe a duty of reasonable care in such contexts. Restrictive
courts apply no-duty rules to cut off liability before the claims reach the
jury, while more liberal courts "find" a duty and generally permitjuries to
decide whether the defendants acted reasonably under the
circumstances.
One striking feature of these third-party criminal attack cases,
however, is their disproportionate importance to particular social groups.
Thus, the third-party rape and sexual assault cases most often feature
female plaintiffs and are easily coded in the public's imagination as
11women's" litigation, although we know that men can be victims of sexual
assault as well. Less evident is the connection between third-party
criminal attack cases and race and economic status. However, when
criminal attacks occur, as they often do in high-crime areas-areas
characterized not only by high rates of crime, but also by high
concentrations of minority and low-income persons-the victims are
likely to be the residents of such locations. Denying recovery through
0e ifa. notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
See infrants8-0 n acmayn et
1See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 120-194 and accompanying text.
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declarations of no-duty rules in such cases thus tends to fall more harshly
on those groups that regularly encounter these heightened dangers in
their everyday lives.
Part 1V.A tracks the history of the debate over duty in third-party
sexual rape and sexual assault cases. This Section discusses cases both
imposing and rejecting a duty, and identifies a move by some courts to
articulate a concept of reasonable care that contemplates an equal level
of safety for both sexes. It concludes with a discussion of the provisions of
the Restatement (Third) that presupposes a landowner's or shopkeeper's
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent violence by third-parties,
except in exceptional cases in which the court is willing to rely on a
countervailing policy or principle to reject a duty. Part IV.C looks at non-
sexual criminal attack cases and canvasses and critiques the policy
arguments courts have put forth for rejecting a duty, even when attacks
are committed in high-crime neighborhoods. It makes the case for
imposition of a duty in such cases through recognition of an equal right
to safety for persons who live in high-crime neighborhoods.
Finally, in this age of comparative negligence, courts in third-party
attack cases have had to confront the uncomfortable question of victim
fault to decide, for example, whether a rape victim who sues a hotel for
negligently failing to provide reasonable security should have her
damages reduced because of her own "unreasonable" failure to protect
herself against the risk of rape. 14Part 1V.B. examines the case law on
victim fault in both acquaintance and stranger rape cases. With respect to
victim fault, the courts treat sexual assault cases distinctively, evidencing a
greater willingness to scrutinize the victim's behavior than in non-sexual
criminal assault cases. In this novel context, feminist arguments in favor
of a "no duty" rule for victims have been made to protect women's
autonomy and mobility and to assure that women are not required to
sacrifice their liberty for tort protection. 1
Overall, this sketch of contemporary tort doctrine suggests an
interesting relationship between norms of social equality, particularly
with respect to gender, and the evolving shape of tort law. Despite a lack
of perspectival standards, tort law is not always oblivious to differing
perspectives and retains its capacity to promote social equality as one of
many goals, alongside compensation of injured parties and deterrence of
harm. Rather than attempting to incorporate non-dominant perspectives
procedurally through the use of perspectival standards, however, the
more prominent progressive move is one that is substantive and
contextual, namely, selecting special contexts for protection, such as
third-party criminal assault cases, and applying across-the-board duty (or
no-duty) rules that directly promote the interests of subordinate groups.
'~See infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. Rrv. 1413 (1999) [hereinafter Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules].
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The Article concludes by endorsing the approach of those courts that
have promoted egalitarian interests through this method. 16
II. RPS AND PHYSICAL INJURY
THE RESTA TEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
One of the basic tort concepts first encountered in a first-year torts
course is that of the reasonable person. Students soon learn that the RPS
is an "objective" and "universal" standard that seeks to evaluate conduct
from a neutral position and does not turn on the personal characteristics
or traits of the party. They are told that one advantage of such a standard
is its uniform ity-conduct required of the reasonable person does not
vary according to a party's race, gender, intelligence, wealth, etc.-with
the happy result that a minimum level of safety is secured for all persons.
This simple explanation, however, is immediately complicated by the fact
that the RPS is also a contextual standard: The requirement is to exercise
"reasonable care under all the circumstances" of the case. Inquisitive
students then often want to know whether some important fact about a
person, for example, that the person is elderly or frail, qualifies as a
"circumstance" that can properly be taken into account to gauge whether
that person acted reasonably. At this point, the standard reply of many
torts professors is to draw a distinction between the external
circumstances of the case (e.g., whether it was raining at the time of the
accident, whether the terrain was hazardous, etc.) and the internal
personal characteristics of the party, noting that, with very few
exceptions, the latter are to be excluded from the reasonableness
evaluation.
What makes this standard reply so unsatisfyring, of course, is the
practical (and perhaps even theoretical) inability to separate external
circumstances or situations from the personal identity of the actors
involved in the case. At one level, we know that because judges and juries
can actually see that a defendant is elderly, or that the plaintiff is a young
woman, they are not likely to be able to erase such facts from their minds
when it comes time to make judgments about the reasonableness of the
party's actions. Even more significant, as a normative matter, the
morality-laden rhetoric supporting negligence liability makes it seem
inappropriate to divorce the person from the action. It is at this point
that the issue of perspective comes more sharply into focus. That same
inquisitive student may well ask whether it is fair to label a party's
conduct unreasonable and substandard if other persons in the party's
position, or who share the party's perspective, would notjudge it to be so.
Particularly at a time in U.S. history marked by culture wars, sharp
political and ideological divides, and a growing recognition by social
scientists that human perception of facts is influenced by some of the
very personal traits and characteristics ruled out of bounds by the
"~ See infra Part V.
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objective RPS, 17 we might well question whether the objective RPS is
outmoded and badly in need of a makeover.
The Restatement (Third) provisions on the RPS in physical injury cases,
however, bear no trace of this tension and in many respects look quite
similar to those in the 1965 version. The principal section of the
Restatement (Third), Section 3, defines negligence as the failure to exercise
"reasonable care under all the circumstances." 18The comments following
the section indicate that this formulation is faithful to the familiar RPS,
explaining that " [b] ecause a 'reasonably careful person' (or a 'reasonably
prudent person') is one who acts with reasonable care, the 'reasonable
care' standard for negligence is basically the same as a standard
expressed in terms of the 'reasonably careful person' (or the 'reasonably
prudent person').'
It is important to mention that the Restatement (Second) used explicitly
gendered language, defining negligence as the failure to act as a
"reasonable man under like circumstances" and proceeding in the
commentary to discuss the "[qlualities of the 'reasonable man"' which
made up this "fictitious person," all without mention of how women
20
might fit into the standard . In accord with the common linguistic usage
at the time, presumably the term "man" was meant as a universal term
and it was assumed that women were automatically covered under the
standard).2' As feminists would later point out, however, such sexist
language had the capacity to render women and their perspectives
invisible by tacitly accepting that men and male perspectives rightly set
the norms of conduct for the whole socie ty.2
In contrast to its predecessor, the Restatement (Third) scrupulously
uses gender-neutral language throughout, relying on inclusive terms such
as "person" and "actor." While the new terminology is no longer offensive
to women, it is not clear that it is meant to signal any substantive change
in tort law. Significantly, there is no explanation for the shift in
terminology, even in the section of the commentary devoted to
"terminology. 2 3 Particularly for younger lawyers and students who have
never read the prior Restatements, gender is once again invisible. The
silence about the shift from "reasonable man" to "reasonable person"
creates the impression that the change is not important enough to
'~See infra notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3.
Id. § 3 cmt. a.
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 283 & cmt. a (1965).
21 See CASEY MILLER & KATE SWIFT, THE HANDBOOK OF NONSEXIST WRITING 9-34
(1980) (discussing common use of "man" as a false generic).
22 See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Se~f-Defee and Provocation, 14 Loxy. L.A. L. REv. 435,
436 (1980).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. a.
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mention and that the new gender-neutral term is simply in keeping with
24
current linguistic conventions.
Section Three of the Restatement (Third) lists the primary factors to
consider in ascertaining whether a person's conduct lacks reasonable
care, namely: (1) the foreseeable likelihood that conduct will result in
harm; (2) the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue; and (3)
the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm .2 This
formulation gives pride of place to the venerable Learned Hand test for
negligence, often favored by law and economics adherents who tend to
support negligence liability for reasons of deterrence or safety
26incentives: However, the approach is carefully described in the
,27
Restatement's commentary as a "balancing approach," a term presumably
broad enough to satisfy at least some scholars in the "corrective justice"
camp who support negligence liability on "fairness" grounds. 2
For our purposes, what is most striking about the new Restatement
(Third)'s provisions on standard of care is their strict adherence to the
objective RPS, making room for only two longstanding exceptions. Thus,
the Restatement (Third) continues to endorse a modification of the RPS
only with respect to children and persons with physical disabilities. The
modification of the RPS for children authorizes the most individualized
standard of care: it instructs that a child's conduct be judged against
"that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence, and
experience... ."29In cases involving persons with physical disabilities, the
applicable provision permits consideration of one trait, the physical
disability, and requires that the actor's conduct conform to that of "a
reasonably careful person with the same disability."30 It should be noted
that, in each instance, the objective RPS is not abandoned in favor of a
subjective standard that depends on an actor's state of mind, but is
merely modified to allow the fact-finder to compare the actor's conduct
against other actors in the distinctive subgroup to which that actor
belongs. Thus, the primary effect of modifying the objective RPS
standard is to acknowledge the existence of some important differences
among persons and to judge those persons only against others in their
subgroup. The authorized modifications, however, are generally
regarded as favorable to the targeted groups because such persons are no
24 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 3, 22 (1988) ("Although tort law protected itself from allegations of sexism, it
did not change its content and character.").
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3.
'6 See Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and
Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 577, 616 (2010).
2' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. e.
28 See Ernest J. Weinrib. Corrective justice in a Nutshell. 349 U. TORONTO L.J. 349.
355 (2002) (discussing corrective justice as a theoretical framework fair to both
parties).
2' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10 (a).
Id. §11 (a).
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longer required to conform to a standard of conduct that may be
31impossible for them to meet.
However, courts have shown very little inclination to modify the RPS
to take into account many of the other differences among persons that
often matter greatly in our society. Despite the major cultural and legal
developments that have taken place in the last few decades, including
passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990,32 the Restatement
(Third) has not altered the RPS for persons with emotional or mental
disabilities, flatly stating that "Ialn actor's mental or emotional disability
is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless
the actor is a child. 3 3 Similarly, old age in and of itself is not taken into
account when assessing the negligence of an elderly party's conduct.3 4
This disparate treatment of physical and mental disabilities has long
been controversial, and the controversy is only heightened by the
movement for parity of treatment of mental and physical disabilities in
other areas of law.' Any attempt to justify the disparity requires analysis
of the underlying reasons for modifying the RPS with respect to children
and persons with physical disabilities, as compared to the situation of
persons with mental disorders. At first blush, it seems that in all three
instances, members in the group, through no fault of their own, arguably
lack the capacity or ability to conform their conduct to the objective RPS.
Thus, both children and persons with mental or emotional disabilities
may be incapable of exercising reasonable judgment in gauging the
existence or severity of a risk, and persons with physical disabilities may
be incapable of negotiating the dangers of a particular physical risk.
Recognizing this crucial similarity, the Restatement (Third) shifts ground
and defends the courts' refusal to take into account a person's mental
disorders on the basis of "administrability" and "causal connection .
The commentary asserts that with respect to limited or moderate mental
disorders, a mental disability is ordinarily not "especially important as an
explanation for conduct."317 It also expresses concern for the
administrative difficulty in identifying the wide range of moderate mental
" See Anita Bernstein, The Communities that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHi.-
KENT L. REV. 735, 739 (2002) (stating that commentators agree that children and the
disabled are treated more leniently than the RPS demands).
12Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 11I(C).
31 Id. § 11I cmt. c. If old age is affiliated with a particular physical disability,
however, the fact finder is allowed to consider the physical disability, just as in the
case of younger persons with physical disabilities.
'See, eg, Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 585 (2002); John W. Parry. Health and Long-Term Disability Insurance for Persons
with Mental Disabilities, 34 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DisAwiIy L. REP. 166 (2010); Lorraine
Schmall, One Step Closer to Mental Health Parity, 9 NEV. L.J. 646 (2009).
1RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § I1I cmt. e.
37 Id.
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disorders and assessing their significance . With respect to those persons
whose mental disorder, such as psychosis, is so severe as to make it likely
that they would pose a serious danger, the Restatement (Third)
commentary bluntly makes the policy argument that "there can be
doubts as to whether the person should be allowed to engage in the
normal range of society's activities.-19
Despite the courts' refusals to modify the RPS in cases of mental
disability, the main justification for departing from the objective RPS in
tort law continues to be recognized differences in capacity or ability. It is
significant that the authorized modifications of the RPS for persons with
physical disabilities and for children, for the most part, revolve around
such differences, rather than differences in perspective, social position,
40
values, or prevailing customs associated with the particular social group.
With respect to negligence liability for physical harm, this emphasis on
capacity or ability is understandable, given the central role that it plays in
allowing persons to act safely and prudently to evaluate and respond to
physical risks. Therefore, it is not surprising that most attention has been
paid to those personal characteristics that are most likely to affect a
person's ability to take the precautions required to guard against risks to
their own physical safety and the safety of others. Overall, the *new
Restatement (Third)'s provisions on the RPS suggest that a modification is
in order only in very limited instances, and endorse the objective
standard absent a clear difference in abilities or capacities.
The unwillingness of courts to go beyond the narrow exceptions to
the objective RPS goes a long way toward explaining why differences in
gender, race, or other socially relevant differences have not been
considered good candidates for a modification of the RPS. Nowadays, we
tend to dispute the validity of essential or biologically-based gender
differences that would be most relevant to physical safety. Women are not
worse drivers than men,' for example, and women now have the
opportunity to gain experience in risky activities so as to make it seem
unjustified to apply a lesser "women only" standard to female defendants.
The same proposition holds true with respect to racial groups: Race bears
no correlation to safety-related conduct and has no effect on a person's
ability to exercise prudentjudgment. Coupled with the cultural and legal
38 id.
SId.
The Restatement (Third) was adopted before the publication of Rethinking the
Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard, which argues
that the child standard implicitly subsidizes a "boys wI be boys" standard of care that
has often excused reckless behavior by male defendants. See MAYO MORAN,
RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
OBJECTIVE STANDARD 58 (2003).
4' In fact, until age 60, women are involved in fewer automobile crashes than
men, suggesting to one researcher that, as a group, women "make safer driving
choices" than men. Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 175, 188 (2001).
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disinclination to apply separate race-based or gender-based standards, it
is thus not Surprising that tort law has never formally endorsed a
"reasonable woman" or "reasonable black person" standard of care in
physical harm cases.
111. MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVAL STANDARDS
Despite its accepted status within tort law, the objective RPS goes
against the grain of a large body of interdisciplinary and critical
scholarship that has long disputed the concept of objectivity and
theorized about the importance of perspective. The starting point for
much of this scholarship is that there are many different ways of seeing
the world and that, in a sense, each of us is a biased observer who sees the
world only from his or her own perspective . Difficulty arises, however,
because people rarely acknowledge the partiality of their own
perspective. Instead, it is common for the observer to regard his or her
perceptions as objectively accurate and to ignore the perspective of
others. Accordingly, many scholars have chosen to investigate the
relationship between knowledge and power and expressed skepticism
about claims of objectivity and neutrality and about those statements that
purport to have universal applicabili ty. The take-home message of much
of this work is that frequently what passes for the whole truth is instead a
representation of events from the perspective of those who possess the
power to have their version of reality accepted . As Michael Selmi
summarizes this body of work, "[fln the best tradition of critical theory,
the scholarly literature has demonstrated that there is no neutral baseline
from which we can evaluate social experience. Rather, our baselines are
invariably shaped by our experiences .'
Critical legal scholars have pointed out that actors in the legal system
are not immune from the potential for bias produced by partial
perspectives and have no special access to the truth. Interdisciplinary
legal scholar Martha Minow, for example, observed that the problem is
most acute when judges are forced to confront the situation of "someone
they think is very much unlike themselves . 4 In such cases, she sees a risk
that judges "will not only view that person's plight from their own
vantage point but also fail to imagine that there might be another
vantage point. 4 7 To counteract this tendency, it is necessary to extend
42 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING, ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AIMERICAN LAw 60 (1990).
" Id. at 60; Michael Selmi, Comment, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective
Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 657, 661 (2003).
14 MINOw, supra note 42, at 60 ("The ideal of objectivity itself suppresses the
coincidence between the viewpoints of the majority and what is commonly
understood to be objective Or unbiased."').
45 Selmi, supra note 43, at 661 (footnote omitted).
46MINOW, supra note 42, at 66.
47 Id.
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one's limited perspective and to search out and try to understand the
perspective of others. Particularly given the relative lack of
representation of women and minorities on the bench , one major
concern is that there are bound to be gaps in understanding between
judges and litigants, which could result in adverse judgments for
underrepresented groups, It is true that juries are more diverse and
representative of the general population and can bring their differing
perspectives to bear in deciding cases .5 0 This ameliorating factor is
activated, however, only if cases are sent to the jury and are not decided
on legal grounds by the judge alone.
As a practical matter, taking steps to incorporate diverse perspectives
emerges as most important in contexts in which the distinctive
experiences of subordinate groups are at the heart of a legal claim. Thus,
when a female plaintiff pursues a tort claim arising out of a physician's
negligence in causing a miscarriage,"5 it is particularly important that the
court understand the experience of pregnancy, the possible harms that
may flow from severing or damaging a mother's connection to her
unborn child, and the importance of procreative choice in the lives of
women. Similarly, when a minority plaintiff complains of racial
harassment on the job and sues for damages under an intentional tort
theory, 52 it is crucial that the court appreciate the impact of the harassing
conduct from the victim's perspective, in light of the historical position
of minorities in that organization and their likelihood of encountering
"See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HA~tv. L. REv. 829, 881
(1990) ("Because knowledge arises within social contexts and in multiple forms, the
key to increasing knowledge lies in the effort to extend one's limited perspective.").
4In 2010, 264 out of 1277 federal judges (20.51 %) were women. See Biographical
Directory of Federal judges, FED. JUDIcIAL CTR., http://wwiv.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf-
page/judges.html. In 2010, 8.86% of the federal judiciary was Afican-American,
5.59% was Hispanic/ Latino, and 1.01% was Asian-American. Id. In 2010, 4521 out of
17,108 (26%) state court judges were women. 2010 Representation of United States State
Court Women judges, NAT'L AWsN Or WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.nawj.org/
us-state-court-s tatistics_201 0. asp. In 2010, 5.9% of state court judges were African-
American, 2.8% were Latino, 1.1 % were Asian-American. Am. BAR AsS'N, NATIONAL
DATABASE ON JUDICIAL DrvE~tsrn' IN STATE COURTS (June 16, 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/Jd/display/national.cfm.
'" See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics
of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 325 n.3 (1995) (citing 1991 study of eight
major cities indicating that women comprised an average of 52.875% of serving jurors
in federal courts and 53.75% in state courts ); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of
Summary judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 712
(2007) ('juries are likely to be far more diverse and bring a broader range of
perspectives to bear on the problem."). Racial diversity is much more varied, with
African-American representation in Washington, D.C. reaching as high as 65% in
state courts and 73% in federal courts, but as low as 3% in both state and federal
courts in Boston, and 3% in federal courts in Seattle. Id. (citing JANICE T.
MUNSTERMAN ET AL., THE RELATIONSHIP Or JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO
JURY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE D-1 (1991)).
5' See, e.g, Broadnax v. Gonzales, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004).
5See, e.g., Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2000).
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similar harassment in the future. It is in these gender-related and race-
related contexts that assessments of reasonableness are most likely to
turn on experience and where cultural differences arguably matter the
Mot53
In addition to support from critical theory, a strong argument for
recognition of diverse perspectives comes from empirical social science
research that has begun to document how cultural subgroups see the
world differently. Starting in the 1980s, for example, gender bias task
forces studying the existence and impacts of gender bias in the judicial
system documented what has become known as the "two worlds"
phenomenon 5 Based largely on surveys and focus group interviews of
lawyers and judges, the task forces determined that men and women
often had very different views as to the definition and the prevalence of
gender bias.' For example, when asked about gender bias, men tended
to respond that there was no problem, while women far more often
reported that gender bias was a frequent problem.'t The most extensive
study, conducted by the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force,
determined that differing perspectives accounted for much of this
gender disparity, noting that "when witnessing or engaging in the very
same behaviors, women and men experience, describe, and report
different even ts.""5 Significantly, the task force focused on those gender-
related courtroom interactions and behaviors of employees in the
judicial system that the respondents considered to be offensive,
disparaging, or discriminatory.8 At least when it came to matters of
gender bias, men and women appeared to inhabit different worlds and to
judge reality quite differently.
A similar divide can be found in the perspectives of African-
Americans and whites in matters relating to race discrimination . 'tThere
is now an extensive literature on subtle or unconscious racial bias
documenting how African-Americans define racial bias more broadly
than whites and how such perceptions influence the manner in which
5' See Schneider, suPra note 50, at 706 (discussing importance of the gender of
the decision-maker in sex discrimination cases).
5' For a summary of the findings of more than 40 task force reports on gender,
race and ethnicity, see Judith Resnik, Gender Matters, Race Matters, 14 N.Y.L. SCH-. J.
Hum. RTs. 219, 225-30 (1997).
'5id. at 229-30.
56 id.
1John C. Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final
Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Taskforce, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 950-51 (1994).
5'Id. at 763.
59 For data on the "two worlds" phenomenon as it relates to race and ethnicity in
courts and law firms, see MICH. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE ON RAciAL/ETHNIc ISSUES IN THE
COURTS, FINAL REPORT 13 (1989) (describing "majority males" as the least likely to
perceive racial bias).
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blacks respond to behavior perceived as discriminatory.6W The scholarship
emphasizes the legacy of slavery and segregation, explaining that it lives
on in contemporary black stereotypes of "incompetence, occupational
instability, primitive morality, and similar derogatory perceptions, ,61 and
in the use of "code words, 6 2 and "acts of disregard" 6 3 that convey a
meaning of black inferiority to their target audience. Because whites
often deny harboring racist intentions in such encounters,"4 the "two
worlds" phenomenon has become linked to the concept of unconscious
racism and is often at the heart of controversies over the meaning and
prevalence of race discrimination in everyday life.
Undoubtedly, the most well-documented instance of the "two
worlds" phenomenon comes from the social science research on
workplace sexual harassment.6 A large number of studies have found
gender differences in the way men and women interpret sexualized
conduct on the job. One consistent finding is that, as a rule, women tend
to perceive such behavior as more offensive than men and are more
likely to label the behavior sexual harassment." Particularly with respect
to hostile environment harassment, women are also more likely than
men to perceive the conduct in a neiative way and to conclude that it
had a harmful effect on the target. 'Not surprisingly, these gender
differences are most likely to surface in ambiguous cases where there is
room for argument. In such cases, perspective can make a difference in
result, prompting one author to conclude that the differences found
'SeeJENNIFER L. HOCHSCHiLD, FACING UP TO THE AMERiCAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS,
AND THE SOUL Or THE NATION 57 (1995) ("[W]hites see little and lessening
discrimination, and blacks feel themselves to be the objects of a lot, even increasing
amounts, of discrimination."); LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION By DEFAULT: How RACISM
BECOMES ROUTINE 54-66 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 H-ARv. L. REv.
1489, 1490 (2005); Terry Smith, Evetyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of
Title VII, 34 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 529, 535 (2003); Lawrence D. Bobo, Michael C.
Dawson & Devon Johnson, Enduring Two-Ness--Through the Eyes of Black America, PUB.
PERSP. May-June 2001, at 13, 15, available at http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
ppscan/123%5C123012.pdf (one-third of whites believe that blacks have achieved
equality, versus fewer than one-tenth of blacks).
61 Smith, supra note 60, at 537.
12 See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1996)
(mentioning racial code words). See also Frank Rudy Cooper, VV~en Machismo Meets
Post-Racialism: The Gates Controversy, 63 (Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper 10-16, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576751 (discussing coded appeals to racial stereotypes).
Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1576 (1989).
6See Cooper, supra note 62, at 64 (describing coded appeals to stereotypes as not
being considered racist); Smith, supra note 60, at 537-38.
"5 For an excellent summary of the social science research, see Elizabeth L.
Schoenfelt, Allison E. Maue & JoAnn Nelson, Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable
Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 Am. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'V& L. 633, 647-51 (2002).
"' Id. at 648.
67 Id. at 649.
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between the sexes is the most salient characteristic in determining what
constitutes sexual harassment.'
Scholars are careful to point out that these gender differences do
not stem from any inherent or biological difference in the way men and
women approach sex, but are rather a product of differing experiences
and social positions. Social psychologist Barbara Gutek explains, for
example, that the differing responses to sexual harassment by men and
women reflects each group's self interest: "It is in men's self-interest to
see relatively little sexual harassment because men are most often the
offenders whereas it is in women's self-interest to see relatively more
sexual harassment because women tend to be the victims in sexual
harassment encounters." 69 It is noteworthy that women's perceptions are
formed against a backdrop of a higher frequency of rape and sexual
assault for their gender group. This awareness has made women wary of
even milder forms of sexual harassment, which are often perceived as
threatening and as a prelude to sexual assault. 0 This well-documented
gender differential in perception of risks associated with sexualized
conduct in the workplace has provided the most compelling argument to
date for adoption of perspectival standards in the law in order to respond
to the core concern that a "sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to
be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of
" 71women.
More recent psychological research has complicated the picture
beyond the "two worlds" phenomenon and has delved, with more
precision, into the mix of factors that produce perceptual divides in our
society. One potentially important finding for tort law comes from
experiments done by cognitive and social psychologists who found that
individuals selectively credit and dismiss dangers in a manner supportive
of their cultural identities. In this vein of scholarship, a person's cultural
world view interacts with gender and race to influence how the person
evaluates risks .7  Thus, whether a person holds egalitarian values and
places a high importance on social solidarity-as opposed to holding
individualistic values and placing a high importance on hierarchy--is a
crucial factor in understanding that person's orientation toward risk.
' John B. Pryor, The Lay Person's Understanding of Sexual Harassment, 13 SEX ROLES
273, 276 (1985).
0~ Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETrHICS &PuB. PoL'y 335, 343 (1992).
7See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAN D. L. REv. 1183, 1204-05 (1989).
71Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
" See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the
White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007).
73 Id.
20101 365
1366 ~LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [o.1:
In a dramatic study that The New York Times credited with being one
of the notable ideas of 2009 ,~ Dan Kahan, David Hoffman and Donald
Braman tested this theory of "cultural cognition of risk.",75 In particular,
they surveyed how people responded to the dangers presented by the
following scenario: a high-speed chase of a speeding motorist, which
ended when the police deliberately rammed the fleeing car after the
motorist refused to pull over. The resulting crash was serious, with the
motorist rendered quadriplegic from his injuries .7The experiment was
drawn from an actual U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court, with
only one dissent, determined that the chase was justified because of the
deadly risk the fleeing motorist posed to the public.7 In determining that
it was proper to take the case from the jury because "no reasonable jury"
could judge the case otherwise, the Court was influenced by its own
viewing of a video of the chase filmed from inside the police cruiser. In
these unusual circumstances, the Supreme Court justices had the rare
opportunity to gauge the relevant risk with their own eyes. The majority
then declared that its perception of the risk was the only reasonable one
under the circumstances. 79
One significant finding of the study was that the Court's perception
of the obvious risks posed to the public by the fleeing motorist was not
shared equally by all the groups surveyed. Although a sizeable majority of
the respondents did indeed interpret the facts the way the Court did,
members of various subcommunities did not. Significantly, the authors
reported that "African Americans, low-income workers, and residents of
the Northeast ... tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts
than did the Court. So did individuals who characterized themselves as
liberals and Democrats."80 These pro-plaintiff respondents fit a
recognizable cultural profile, characterized by egalitarian values and an
emphasis on social solidarity. In interpreting the facts, these respondents
tended to see less danger in the motorist's flight, to attribute more
responsibility to the police for creating the risk, and to find less
justification in the use of deadly force to end the chase."' According to
the authors of the study, the very existence of a recognizable minority
viewpoint signaled a cultural conflict that might better be filtered
through and debated by a jury, rather than evaluated by the judge
"Christopher Shea, Cognitive Illiberalism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009 (Magazine),
at 30.
7' Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837.
852 (2009).
" Id. at 854-55.
7Scott v. Harris, 1278S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007).
71 Id. at 1775-76.
7' Id. at 1776.
Kahan, Hoffman & Bramnan, supra note 75, at 841.
"Id.
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alone .8  The lesson the authors derived from their study is that judges
should exercise caution and a measure of humility before deciding
certain cases summarily, particularly those cases in which there are likely
to be "culturally polarized understandings of fac.""
Even the above thumbnail sketch of the growing research on
multiple perspectives suggests that it is now sufficiently well developed to
pose a challenge to the objective RPS. However, this mounting evidence
that gender, race, and other cultural factors shape our perceptions of risk
does not necessarily point to an easy fix for the inadequacies of the
objective RPS. As relates to legal doctrine, devising a suitable
replacement for objective reasonableness has proved to be difficult and
controversial, even among feminist and critical scholars .
The debate with respect to Title VII sexual harassment law is the
most instructive for our purposes.5 Starting in the early 1990s, some
courts were persuaded by feminist arguments that the harmful quality of
harassing conduct ought to be judged from the victim's or target's point
of view,'1 instead of relying on the non-situated reasonable person
standard. Although none of these courts was willing to rely on the
subjective perception of an individual plain tiff,8 some did endorse a
"reasonable woman" standard or "reasonable victim" standard in order to
avoid minimizing the harm of sexual harassment and to capture the full
nature and extent of plaintiff's sexualized injury. 8
Id. at 90 1.
'Id. at 900. See also Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives
What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 729 (2010) (persons
with a "hierarchical woridview" more likely to believe that a woman consented to sex
in acquaintance rape scenario than persons with an "egalitarian worldview").
SSee Schoenfelt, Maue & Nelson, supra note 65, at 638.
~For discussions of perspectival standards in sexual harassment law, see MARTHA
CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION To FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 90-92, 242-45 (2d ed. 2003);
CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAw OF HER0OwN: THE REASONABLE
WOMAN AS A MEASURE Or MAN (2000).
~" Courts often use the terms "reasonable woman" and "reasonable victim"
interchangeably. See Schoenfelt, Maue & Nelson, supra note 65, at 638-39. For a
discussion of the complexities of using a modified standard in cases of male victims,
see Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 95, 124 (1992).
"See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The
objective standard protects the employer from the 'hypersensitive' employee.").
" See, e.g., McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004)
(applying perspective of the reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic
group of the plaintiff); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying
reasonable woman standard); Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D.
Me.), vacated in part, 765 F. Siipp. 1529, 1532 (D. Me. 1991) (applying reasonable
black person standard); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1993)
(adopting a reasonable woman standard tinder the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination). A powerful early defense of the reasonable woman standard can be
20101 367
1368 ~LEWIS & CLARK L-AW REVIEW [o.1:
At first, it seemed that the U.S. Supreme Court would abruptly shut
down this move away from objectivity when it declared in 1993 that the
touchstone for determining whether a working environment was sexually
hostile was whether "a reasonable person would find [t] hostile or
abusive." 9 Soon thereafter, however, the Court signaled that it was not
averse to considering multiple perspectives in such cases, although it
refused to abandon the reasonable person standard. 9 0 Instead, the Court
hinted at ways of enlarging the concept of the reasonable person to take
into account the social position of both the harasser and the target when
courts and juries assess the seriousness of challenged behavior. Thus, in
a 1998 same-sex harassment case, the Court instructed that harassment
should be judged "from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
Plaint iffs position, considering 'all the circumstances.' . .. [including] the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by
its target. ,2Additionally, in 2006, the Court ruled that the governing
standard in sex-based retaliation cases was that of a "reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position," expressly noting that the plaintiff in the case was the
only woman in her department. This prompted a concurring justice to
assert that the Court's standard would require consideration of some of
the plaintiffs individual characteristics-including "age, gender, and
family re SPonsibilities"-to judge the case from a person in the plaintiff's
position.9 It is still not entirely clear, however, whether it is proper to
instruct a jury that it may take into account a plaintiff's sex in deciding
whether a plaintiff's response to defendant's conduct was reasonable.
In sum, although the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly rejected the
"reasonable woman" standard in Harris, it nevertheless opened the door
to consideration of diverse perspectives in sexual harassment cases. I read
the subtle but telling difference between the reasonable woman standard
and the formulations approved by the Court as primarily a difference in
the weighting of diverse perspectives: Although the Court seems willing
to allow alternative perspectives to be taken into account, it is
nevertheless unwilling to declare that those perspectives should govern.9
found in the dissenting opinion of Judge Damon Keith in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627-28 (6th Cir. 1986).
89Harris v. Forklift Sys,. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
SOncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
91 Id.
9' Id. (emphasis added).
"Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69-70 (2006)
(emphasis added).
9Id. at 79 (Alitoj, concurring in the judgment).
'5 Cf. UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (March 19, 1990),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html ("The reasonable person
standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of
acceptable behavior.").
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This cautious and somewhat ambivalent approach to infuising
perspective into Title VII civil rights law mirrors the lukewarm reception
given to the reasonable woman standard in the scholarly literature. Early
on, feminist critics of the reasonable woman standard expressed
concerns that modifying the standard was no cure for possible sexist
applications of any revised standard .9 They worried thatjudges andjuries
could continue to pour traditional gender stereotypes into the new
standard by simply assuming that a reasonable woman would embrace
customary (and often inegalitarian) views about sexual conduct and
gender relations . If this occurred, the new reasonable woman standard
might end up reinforcing gender inequality, rather than challenging it,
particularly if the mere existence of separate gender standards signaled
that there were natural differences between the sexes that the law ought
to take into account. A related concern was that, as applied, the
reasonable woman standard would be prone to the dangers of gender
essentialism." The fear was that the search for the viewpoint of the
reasonable woman might collapse into a futile search for a consensus
viewpoint among women, with the result that the values of the more
dominant members of the group-namely, white, affluent, heterosexual
women-would be misconstrued as representative of the whole. i Despite
attempts by scholars to reconstruct the content of the reasonable woman
standard along feminist lines,') misgivings about adopting the reasonable
woman standard persisted, even in the face of a growing appreciation for
the "multiple perspectives" account of social reality.")
Coupled with these theoretical objections, there are lingering doubts
about whether such a minor change in the wording of the standard
would make any significant difference in the outcome of cases. 1 02 The
limited empirical evidence suggests that it would not.10 3  One
experimental study of undergraduates' reactions to sexual harassment
scenarios, for example, found that a change in the standard used (from
reasonable person to reasonable woman) did not affect the respondents'
assessment of sexual harassment, although women expressed more
SSee CHAMALLAS, supra note 85, at 245.
See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41, 63-64 (1989).
~See CH-AMALLAS, Supra note 85, at 9 1-92.
See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990).
"0 See Chamallas, supra note 86, at 96; Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman:
Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, DISSENT, 48, 50-51 (Winter 1995); Gillian
K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1157 (1995).
'1See Schoenfelt, Maue & Nelson, supra note 65, at 669.
... See Nicole Newman, The Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference?, 27 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 529, 554 (2007).
'0' See Schoenfelt, Maue & Nelson, supra note 65, at 669; Newman, supra. note
102, at 554-55.
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confidence in their finding of sexual harassment under the reasonable
woman standard. 14Another study measuring the reactions of both
college students and adults to detailed case studies of harassment suits
likewise found that the legal standard chosen had only very small effects
on people's judgment of sexual harassment. 15Similarly, in a recent
experimental study of responses to acquaintance ra~ cnro oee
after the famous case of Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 0 Dan Kahan's team of
cultural cognition researchers found that differences in the wording of
legal definitions of rape did not significantly affect the subjects'
willingness to convict.10 7
In actual litigation, moreover, where the jurors can see the parties
for themselves, it is doubtful that any particular formulation of the legal
standard will control their assessment of the significance of gender in
deciding the merits of the case. There is thus a "tempest in a teapot"
quality to the debate over the reasonable woman standard that threatens
to eclipse the larger objective of purging sexism from existing legal
standards and changing the law in an egalitarian direction that does not
submerge women's perspectives on matters of sexual abuse and
harassment.
Compared with civil rights law, there has been less debate in tort law
about modifyiing the objective RPS standard to incorporate differing
gender perspectives and little pressure to adopt a reasonable woman
standard. 0 8 As discussed in Part 11, in contrast to Title VII cases,
contemporary courts in torts cases have not tinkered with the
formulation of the objective RPS to authorize gender to be taken into
consideration from the perspective of a "reasonable person in plaintiffs
position" or as part of the social context.'0 Additionally, feminist torts
scholarship has not generally identified revision of the reasonable person
standard as a top priority for producing egalitarian reform, but rather
has fixed its attention on other topics."
In an early groundbreaking essay critiquing sexism in tort law, Leslie
Bender did attack the RPS as historically infected by male bias, asserting
that it embraced "the perspective of a male judge, lawyer, or law
professor, or even a female lawyer trained to be 'the same as' a male
'04 See Schoenfelt, Maue & Nelson, supra note 65, at 665.
'0' See Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5
PSYcHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 596. 623 (1999).
"6641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
'0' Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. Rxv. 729, 733 (2010).
IS' See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussing critique of RPS in
statutory civil rights law).
'0' See supra at notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
"0O For discussions of feminist and critical torts scholarship in the United States,
see Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 575
(1993); and CHAMALLAS &WRIGGINS, supra note 5, at 30-34 (2010).
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lawyer ."''. Notably, however, she did not recommend adopting a
reasonable woman standard, but argued instead for re-fashioning the
RPS along cultural feminist lines to require individuals to display the
heightened level of care or concern they would take for a "neighbor" or
"social acquaintance" rather than a stranger.12
Later feminist torts scholarship has been more nuanced and less
confident of sex bias in the application of the objective RPS. For
example, Margo Schlanger's historical study of three sets of negligence
cases from 1860 to 1930 concluded that rather than ignoring gender and
setting the standard of care exclusively on male experience, many courts
took the gender of the parties into account as an important factor in
making determinations of reasonableness, with mixed and complicated
results."' She uncovered many older cases in which courts seemed to
apply a gender-s 9ecific standard of care that facilitated recovery for
female plaintiffs. 4However, resorting to a gender-specified standard
could also operate as a barrier to recovery and reinforce disparaging
stereotypes about women as incompetent and less physically agile than
men."' In asserting contributory negligence defenses, for example, some
litigants argued that women ought to be required to exercise extra care
in light of their presumed fragility."" Overall, Schlanger's research
provides little support either for retaining the objective RPS or for
moving to the reasonable woman standard. Instead, it lends historical
grounding for the empirical studies, mentioned above,' 7that have
concluded that the precise formulation of the standard of care has little
effect on decision-making.
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the lack of enthusiasm
for modifying the objective RPS in tort law as a complete rejection of the
"'multiple perspectives" critique of objectivity. Perhaps because of its
familiarity and visibility, the RPS is often thought of as the obvious point
of entry for feminist and critical interventions into tort law."" However, in
IILeslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theoiy and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
3, 23 (1988). See also Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues
in a Torts Course, I YALEJ.L. & FEMINIsM 41, 57-65 (1989).
... Bender, Feminist Theoiy and Tort, supra note I 11, at 25.
'1. Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21
1-ARv. WOMEN'S L.. 79 (1998) [hereinafter Schlanger, Injured Women].
114 Id.
1Id. at 84-85. See also BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY:
GENDER, RACE, LAw, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION 1865-1920 177 (2001)
(describing how women's injuries encouraged courts to expand protection, while
reinforcing prevailing stereotypes of white women as fragile and emotional).
... Margo Schianger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 769, 775-78 (2001) ("a 'reasonable woman'
standard, notwithstanding its rhetorical appeal, frequently enforces as well as reflects
a masculine vision of female dependence and fragility.").
117 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
"'8 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGC.1NS, Supra note 5, at 31 (discussing critical torts
scholarship).
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the United States, the "action" has been elsewhere, away from standard of
care, and instead centered around contentious debates over duty,
particularly in specific gender-related and race-related contexts."" The
next Part analyzes cases of third-party criminal attacks as a prime
example of such a clash of perspectives.
TV. THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL ATTACK CASES
As discussed in Part 11, neither modifications for gender or race, nor
consideration of multiple perspectives have found their way into
negligence doctrine governing the formulation of the standard of care in
physical injury cases. 0In one important subset of cases known as "third-
party" criminal attack cases, however, courts have been forced to make
determinations of duty and reasonable care that frequently bear on the
gender, race, or economic status of the victims.' 2 ' To be sure, courts and
commentators have not drawn an explicit connection between the duty
controversies in these cases and the debate about multiple perspectives.
But they do share an important common theme: They each implicate the
fundamental question of determining the level of protection required by
law when vulnerable groups are disproportionately exposed to injuries
and risks.12 2
In third-party criminal attack cases, a key underlying issue is whether
the norm of reasonable care should be set at a level that provides equal
safety for women and for residents of high-crime neighborhoods. This is
the kind of contested issue likely to expose diverse perspectives and
"culturally polarized understandings of fact."'12 3 Although framed in
abstract, neutral terms, 2 4 the doctrinal debate over whether to impose a
duty to exercise reasonable care and, importantly, whether ajury will be
given authority to decide the case, 15has significant consequences for
victims of assault who have an interest in having their perspectives
considered and understood by legal decision makers. Getting to the jury
in such cases increases the chances that "someone like them" will have a
role in decision making and that diverse perspectives in controversial
contexts will not be excluded.
A. Duty and Third-Party Rape and Sexual Assault Cases
Third-party criminal attack cases present difficult issues of duty that
are not present when a rape or other crime victim sues the assailant
'~Id. at 89-117 (discussing duty in gender and race-related contexts).
See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
11See infra notes 151-82, 208-14, 233-51 and accompanying text.
2See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
123 Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 75, at 900.
124 See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
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directly. In Such direct cases, the plaintiff frequently asserts an
intentional tort, such as battery or assault, 12and there is no question that
the assailant owes a duty to refrain from intentionally injuring the
plaintiff. In third-party cases, however, the underlying claim is one of
negligence, not intentional harm: The crux of the case against the
defendant is the failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent the rape or
attack and thus hinges on defendant's role in facilitating an avoidable
injury. Defendants in these third-party cases are frequently institutional
actors, such as landlords, businesses, schools, and other entities who
routinely make cost/benefit decisions about the level of safety and
security they will provide to their customers, tenants, employees, and
members of the general public .1 In the aggregate, their decisions about
whether to invest in safety have systemic effects on rates of crime, quality
of neighborhoods, and choices available to affected citizens.
Although third-party defendants are commonly viewed as less
morally culpable than assailants, they are frequently the primary target of
civil actions.128 Ellen Bublick conducted an empirical study of civil sexual
assault cases, which found that the number of civil cases brought by
sexual assault victims had increased dramatically in the last 30 years and
that the "vast majority" of cases at the appellate level involved at least
some claims against a third-party defendant. 2 ) This shift toward suing
third parties has been so prominent that Bublick described it as "an
evolution in the very nature of the litigation itself."' 30 There are multiple
reasons for the shift, including, of course, the greater likelihood of
collecting a judgment from an institutional third-party than from a
criminal assailant.2 31 Most importantly, for our purposes, a shift in
cultural attitudes has taken place that has also made suing third-parties
for failing to prevent rapes and sexual assault seem reasonable and
appropriate. Bublick expressed the view that changes in gender roles and
sex-related norms, including the movement for rape reform, contributed
to the "contemporary case law's intrinsic sense that private parties should
play a role in curtailing sexual assault."'13 2 This sense that responsibility for
sexual assaults should not be limited to criminal assailants marks a
significant change in causal attribution which has considerable potential
to steer tort law in an egalitarian direction.
126 See, e.g, Williams v. Moore, 36 So. 3d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing a
bar fight that resulted in intentional tort action against the attackers).
121 See infra notes 151-82, 233-51 and accompanying text.
21 See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil
Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. Rrv. 55, 61 (2006).
28Id. at 58-6 1.
'~Id. at 6 .
Id. at 90-105. Private parties, rather than public entities, are more likely to be
sued in third-party rape cases. The prospects of securing a tort award against public
authorities for injuries caused by inadequate policing are very slim, due to immunity
and other special doctrines which broadly protect public entities from liability.
112 Id. at 62.
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As might be expected given the contested values at stake, the legal
doctrine with respect to third-party criminal attack cases is currently in a
state of confusion. An article co-authored by one of the Reporters of the
Restatement (Third) notes that in this area, " [c] ourts say and do things that
seem wildly inconsistent."' Perhaps the only clear trend is one of
conceptualization. In contrast to earlier times, the problem of
intervening criminal acts is now largely regarded as a problem of duty,
rather than of proximate cause.13 4 In the past, the general rule was that
intervening criminal conduct severed the causal chain, resulting in no
proximate cause as a matter of law.' 3 5 Contemporary courts are far less
likely to rely on proximate cause and to rule that the sexual assault or
other criminal act severs the causal chain. 16Instead, the fight is now over
duty with no clear direction in the case law. 137 As prominent treatise
writer Dan Dobbs sums up the current state of the law, "there is no
blanket duty any more than there is a blanket imuiy"3
It is important to point out that the doctrine governing third-party
criminal attack cases draws no formal distinction between rape and
sexual assault cases on the one hand, and cases involving other types of
criminal attacks on the other hand. Nevertheless, in sexual assault cases,
some courts have regarded gender as an appropriate factor to consider in
deter-mining whether to impose a duty of reasonable care and have
begun to articulate a concept of reasonable care that contemplates an
equal level of safety for both sexes. 3Although not expressed in so many
words, there appears to be sense oii the part of these courts that tort law
requires that premises be made reasonably safe for women as well as men
and that, in making safety decisions, it is unreasonable to ignore women's
disproportionate vulnerability to sexual assault.
Recent premises liability cases brought against owners of residential
and commercial property for injuries sustained as a result of criminal
attacks most vividly demonstrate this point. In reflecting on the
increasing willingness of courts to impose a duty in the premises liability
context, Dan Dobbs took notice of the gender-marked character of the
cases and observed that "many courts have now imposed a duty of
reasonable care to maintain the physical condition of the premises so as
to minimize the risk of assaults and robberies, which often involve rapes
and killings of women or sexual molestation of children.' 4 0 In these
cases, courts consider the gender of victims to decide whether the
'"' W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 671
(2008).
'34 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 474 (2000).
135 id.
136 Id.
... See Cardi & Green, supra note 133, at 671.
.3. DOBBS, Supra note 134, at 474.
"' See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
140 DOBBS, Supra note 134, at 880-81 (footnote omitted).
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defendant should have foreseen the attacks and whether the defendant's
unreasonable failure to take precautions warrants submitting the case to
the j Ury.14
One notable opinion highlighting the render of the plaintiff was
L.A. C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., ISa 2002 case involving the
rape of a 12-year-old girl in a shopping mall in Kansas City. The rape was
committed by a 15-year-old boy who grabbed the plaintiff s purse and ran
off with it into the hallway. She followed him, demanded her purse back,
and then agreed to kiss him in order to get her property back. Shortly
thereafter, he grabbed her, carried her away screaming, and raped her
on the catwalk, a walkway connecting the mall to the parking lot.
Although her friend reported the incident to security guards, they did
nothing, saying that they believed the young man was 'just playing. 1 4 3
Reversing a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
Missouri Supreme Court detailed the disproportionate risks faced by
women shoppers and the mall owner's responsibility to take measures to
cut down on crimes against them .1 44 As in most third-party criminal attack
cases, one key question in deciding duty was whether the risk of attack-
in this case, the risk of rape-was foreseeable. 14 Significantly, in the three
years prior to the attack on the plaintiff, there had been only one prior
sexual assault at the mall.4 6 'Although this fact alone would be enough to
persuade some courts to find a lack of foreseeability and consequently no
duty, the Missouri court elected to consider the history of all violent
attacks against shoppers and employees at the mall and to count the
number of female victims. 47 By this measure, there were 75 prior violent
crimes at the mall and, importantly, 62% of the crimes with identifiable
victims were committed against women.14 8 A special box in the court's
opinion listed 16 of these prior incidents, several of which involved purse
snatchings and female victims. 49 This unusual presentation of the facts
was designed to drive home a point related to foreseeability and duty,
specifically, that "Ff1 oreseeability does not require identical crimes and
identical locations.""50 In a matter-of-fact statement with major
implications for third-party rape cases, the court observed that " [v] iolent
'' See L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257-59 (Mo.
2002) (en banc) (reviewing past violence around the shopping center and
emphasizing the attacks against women specifically); Gans v. Parkview Plaza P'ship,
571 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Neb. 1997) (mentioning the relevance of the fact that the
victims were women).







"' Id. at 254.
'~ 5id. at 259.
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crimes against women, particularly, serve sufficient notice to reasonable
individuals that other violent crimes, including sexual assault or rape of
women, may occur."'
Other courts have likewise dispensed with the necessity of proving
that a similar rape or sexual assault had occurred on the defendant's
premises before imposing a duty to take reasonable care to prevent an
attack. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in Gans v. Parkview
Plaza Partnership, Y52reversed a summary judgment in a third-party rape
case in which a group of four women leased office space for a business.
The incident occurred early one evening, when one of the women was
working alone. She was beaten and raped by a man who entered the
office. Prior to the rape, the tenants had told the owner that they
sometimes worked alone at night and repeatedly complained that their
ofhce was not safe, particularly because the door to their suite could not
be locked from the inside. The owner nevertheless refused to repair the
lock, apparently because the locks had been changed two years before
when the women had first moved into the suite. 1 53 In holding that it was
error not to submit the case to the jury, the Nebraska court emphasized
that the defendant's knowledge was sufficient to put him on notice that a
rape or sexual assault might foreseeably occur. ' In addition to being
located at the end of a dead-end street which "presented an easy target
for criminal activity," the court thought it important that the defendants
had actual knowledge that the lock to the suite could not be operated
from the inside and "that women occupied the suite alone at night."1 -5
Similarly, in an opinion authored by Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she
sat on the D.C. appellate court, the court imposed a duty on a
commercial landlord who failed to secure the vacant portions of an office
building. 1 6 The plaintiff, a woman who worked as a secretary in the
building, was dragged from the elevator and raped by a man who forced
her into one of the unlocked, vacant offices. "-5 Even though no prior
sexual assaults or crimes against the person had taken place on the
premises, the court reasoned that the rape was reasonably foreseeable.'5
151 id.
15' See Cans v. Parkview Plaza P'ship, 571 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1997). See also
Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 482 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Ga. 1997) (holding that
burglaries of vacant apartments are enough to make rape of tenant foreseeable);
Walker v. Aderhold Props., Inc., 694 S.E.2d 119, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding
prior burglaries enough to put landlord on notice that rape could foreseeably occur).
C5 ans, 571 N.W.2d at 277.
14Id. at 269.
15 id.
'5' Doe v. Dominion Bank of Wash., N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The racial implications of the case are discussed in Amy H. Kastely, Out of the
Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Torl, Criminal and
Contract Law, 63 U. GIN. L. Rrv. 269, 289-94 (1994).
15' Dominion Bank of Wash., N.A., 963 F.2d at 1554-55.
151 Id. at 156 1-62.
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For this court, a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent rape was
triggered because the owner was aware of the easy access to vacant areas
of the building and had knowledge of prior thefts and other property
crimes in the building.'"6 Notably, after the rape, the elevators were
programmed to bypass vacant floors, and precautions were taken to lock
off access to all floors not occupied by tenants.16
The more liberal stance toward duty exemplified by the cases just
discussed is often associated with endorsement of a "totality of the
circumstances" approach which dispenses with proof of prior specific
similar crimes as a prerequisite to finding a duty.16' This contrasts with
the more restrictive approaches of some states that have continued to
require evidence of prior similar incidents before a duty is imposed, 12or
have adopted a balancing approach that instructs courts to balance the
cost of precautions against the foreseeability of harm before imposing a
duty. 13However, each of these standards has proven very malleable and
do not always provide a reliable guide to deter-mining when a third-party
cniminal attack case is likely to be sent to thejury.
Two high-profile rape cases from California are commonly cited as
examples of a restrictive approach to duty.16 4 They each involved facts
that could have alerted the defendants to the potential for rape or sexual
assault against women on the premises, similar to the cases imposing a
duty discussed above. However, in both cases, the California Supreme
Court ruled that the commercial business owners had no obligation to
provide security or to take other precautions against the rapes and
upheld summaryjudgments in their favor.
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center 6 involved a claim against a
shopping center for the rape of a woman who was assaulted while she was
opening up a 60-minute photo shop. The woman was the only employee
on duty at the time when a man, armed with a knife, entered the store,
went behind 16the counter, raped her, and fled before being
apprehended. The record indicated that there had been prior criminal
' Id. at 1562.
0 Id. at 1555.
"' See, eg., Monk v. Temple George Assocs., 869 A.2d 179, 188 (Conn. 2005);
Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 972-73 (Ind. 1999); Clohesy v. Food
Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1023 (N.J. 1997).
162 See, e.g., Wilimon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1148, 1150-52 (8th Cir.
1998). A few courts even impose a more highly restrictive standard that requires that
the landowner be aware that harm to the plaintiff is imminent. See DAN B. DOBBS,
PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLIcK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
AccoUNTABILrrTY AND SociAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 48"-4 (6th ed. 2009).
163 See Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1999); McClung
v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 898 (Tenn. 1996).
' Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121 (Cal. 1999); Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza
Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
'65 Ann M., 863 P.2d at 209-1 0.
6Id. at 210.
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activity at the shopping center, including robberies, purse snatchings,
and a man pulling down women's pants. 17Tenants of the shopping
center, including employees of the photo shop where plaintiff was raped,
had voiced complaints about the presence of transients in the area, had
reported that they felt threatened by persons loitering in the area, and
had called the police on more than one occasion. 168 This showing was
insufficient, however, to allow a trial of the case. The California court
worried that a ruling for the plaintiff would mean that shopping centers
would have to incur high costs in providing security guards, and that such
a burden was unfair." Rather than focusing on the risks that a lack of
security might entail for female employees, the court lamented that
" [u] fortunately, random, violent crime is endemic in today's society. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to envision any locale open to the public
where the occurrence of violent crime seems improbable.
1 7 0
This restrictive stance was reinforced by a later ruling by the
California Supreme Court which found no duty in a case in which a
woman was raped in an underground parking garage, despite evidence of
the dilapidated condition of the garage, broken security cameras,
numerou ,?ossible hiding places for assailants, and a lack of
suprvsio.'Beyond California, other courts have similarly been
reluctant to permit juries to hold businesses accountable for failing to
take precautionary measures to protect against rape, even if the plaintiff
produces evidence that an attack was not entirely unforeseeable, citing
unsafe condition of the premises or evidence of prior criminal activity.17
The chaotic state of the law has been fueled by the courts'
insistence-in liberal and in restrictive states alike-that the existence of
a duty turns on whether the criminal activity was foreseeable. As the prior
discussion of the restrictive decisions suggests, however, it is highly




"Id. at 215. Commentators have classified the California approach as a
"balancing approach" in which specific similar incidents are required to impose a
duty if either the risk of attack is low or the cost of safety is high. See DOBBS, Supra note
134, at 878-79. For a discussion of the pro-defendant evolution of California law, see
Stephen D. Sugarman, judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent Caifornia Experience with
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 472 (1999).
"'0 Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
71Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 123-33 (Cal. 1999).
72See, eg, Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 511-18 (7th Cir.
2007) (holding there was no liability to female guest raped in elevator, despite 637
crimes in the immediate neighborhood); Rogers v. Burger King Corp., 82 P.3d 116,
118-22 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (holding there was no duty in case in which female
employee was abducted from restroom located in remote area late at night and
raped).
"3 See DOBBS, Supra note 134, at 474 (holding that courts' rulings are "less about
foreseeability itself than about the courts' notion about the appropriate scope of
duty, which may turn largely on other matters altogether").
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Instead, in many no-duty cases, the defendants had been alerted to
concerns about safety prior to the incidents or could easily predict that a
crime might occur, given the location or state of the premises. 7 4 Rather,
what seems to lie behind many of these restrictive decisions is a policy
judgment that institutional defendants should not be held accountable,
despite the foreseeability of the attacks. In support of this view, restrictive
courts tend to conceptualize the problem as one of "random crime,"
rather than as a systemic problem of high rates of rape and sexual assault
which disparately affect women and other vulnerable groups.17
Interestingly, the new Restatement (Third) has stepped out in front of
the courts by taking the position that it is improper to rely on lack of
foreseeability as a basis for denying a duty in physical harm cases,
including third-party criminal attack cases. Section 7(b) of the Restatement
(Third) creates a default duty of reasonable Care whenever a defendant's
conduct causes physical harm, providing an exception only "[ii] n
exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or 7VOliCy
warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases."' This
default duty to exercise reasonable care operates to impose a duty on
businesses to guard against third-party criminal attacks, whether a
defendant's conduct is characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance. 177
Section 7's default duty of reasonable care applies in cases of misfeasance
where it can be said that a defendant's action created a risk of criminal
activity. 7 If the case is classified as one of nonfeasance, the plaintiff must
prove the existence of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant before a duty is imposed. 1 79 The Restatement's list of special
relationships is quite broad, however, and captures most of the recurring
cases involving third-party cnimes."'
The most innovative aspect of the Restatement (Third) is its rejection
of the use of foreseeability as a ground for deciding whether a duty
exists,""' despite widespread reliance on foreseeability in the various tests
used by the courts. 112The Restatement (Third) recognizes and criticizes this
practice stating that:
judicial reliance on foreseeability under specific facts occurs more
frequently and aggressively in cases involving an affirmative duty
than in other cases.. .. This tendency is even more pronounced in
'~See supra note 172.
'~See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215-16 (Cal. 1993).
76RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 7(b).
177 Id. § 7 cmt. a.
78 d
''Id. § 7 cmt. e.
See id. § 40 (b) (3) (special relationship between "business or other possessor of
land that holds its premises open to the public with those who are lawfully on the
premises"); and id. § 40(b) (6) (special relationship of "landlord with its tenants").
"'See id. §§ 37cmt , 7 cmt~J
... Id. § 7 cmt. f.
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cases in which the alleged duty involves protecting the plaintiff
from third parties, especially the criminal acts of third parties.
Sometimes, courts develop specific rules or balancing tests about
the quantity, quality, and similarity of prior episodes required to
satisfy' foreseeability.... Invoking no duty in these situations is
more comfortable for courts because duty remains a question of law
for the court. Yet determinations of no breach as a matter of law
more accurately reflect that the court is pretermitting jury
consideration of an element of the case traditionally left to the
jury.18
Importantly, this stance marks a rejection of the prominent
California approach and is designed to discourage courts from granting
and upholding summary judgments simply by indicating that the attack
in question was unfore~seeable. However, even under the Restatement's
approach, courts are still entitled to take a case away from the jury by, for
example, determining that the specific precautions taken by defendants
were adequate as a matter of law (i.e., no breach of duty) or for lack of
causation. Additionally, courts are authorized to declare a policy
exception from the duty to exercise reasonable care in "exceptional"
cases. 84 As Jonathan Cardi and Michael Green describe it, however, the
difference in the Restatement's approach is that it "requires judges to
recognize and acknowledge that they are deciding a matter ordinarily left
to the jury" and thus "imposes an appropriate psychological hurdle for a
judge before so ruling."8 5 The main point is to encourage judicial
restraint and transparency and to underscore thatjudicial rulings on duty
constitute "an incursion on the role of the jury as fact-finder and as the
repository of common sense normative wisdom in individual cases." 8
It is not clear whether the courts will give up on foreseeability and
agree to follow the Restatement's injunction to approach duty as a policy
matter. Moreover, a shift to policy does not guarantee that more cases
will be sent to the jury or that women's perspectives will be taken into
account in determining the appropriate level of safety. Nevertheless, the
Restatement's policy approach does seem to invite courts to notice the
gender dimension of third-party rape cases and to consider what effects
allowing or denying such claims might have on the incidence of rape and
sexual assault and ultimately on women's mobility and sexual autonomy.
B. Victim Fault and No-Duty Rules
We have seen that tort doctrine governing duty draws no distinction
between sexual assault and other criminal attack cases. When it comes to
See id. § 37 cmt. f.
84See Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 927 P,2d 1260. 1270 (Cal.
1997) (holding that shopkeeper had no duty to comply with robber's demand for
money).
... Cardi & Green, supra note 133, at 729.
... See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 37 cmt. f.
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matters of victim fault, however, a distinctive body of law has developed
that, in practice, appears limited to rape and sexual assault cases.1 ' In
several third-party sexual assault cases, some courts have held that a rape
victim's "unreasonable" conduct in exposing herself to rape operates to
reduce or deny recovery under a comparative negligence regime." It is
in this corner of the law affecting third-party claims that perspectives and
considerations of gender equality surface most prominently, again
centering on the core issue of duty.
It goes without saying that limiting the legal rights of rape victims if
they fail to prevent or mitigate their injuries is an explosive subject for
feminist legal scholars and activists. In the criminal law context, feminists
have long argued against victim-blaming discourses and special legal
obstacles, such as resistance requirements and perpetrator-centered
definitions of consent that are imposed in rape cases only."" Thus, the
fact that victim fault arises only in third-party rape or sexual assault cases,
and not third-party criminal attack cases more generally, marks this issue
as especially troublesome.
The dilemma over the proper treatment of victim fault in civil rape
cases is primarily a function of the shift to third-party litigation. In earlier
days, when rape victims sued their assailants directly under intentional
tort theories, contributory negligence of the victim was routinely held to
be no defense.'' This same rule largely holds true today in direct claims
against assailants, under the theory' that intentional conduct cannot be
compared to mere negligeiit acts.'-' In third-party cases, however, the
basis for a defendant's liability is negligence, raising the question of
whether courts should follow the usual rule of permitting a plaintiffs
own contributory negligence to reduce recovery. It should be noted,
moreover, that because most jurisdictions embrace a modified system of
comparative fault that bars recovery when a plaintiffs fault reaches a
certain threshold (typically 50% or 51%), the effect of raising a plaintiff s
comparative fault can lead to no recovery at all.19
The kind of behavior that has led courts to submit the question of a
rape victim's fault to the jury follows a script familiar to feminists who
have resisted the persistent cultural tendency to assign women the
responsibility for protecting themselves against sexual assault by
117 See Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1430-31.
.. See, e.g, Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1989).
"'See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, I11 LAw & PHIL. 127, 138-39
(1992); Lani Anne Remick,' Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent
Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (1993); Dana Berliner, Note,
Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 2687, 2688, 2691-92
(1991).
'0See DOBBS, Supra note 134, at 498.
i However, a few courts have even allowed a jury to compare the negligence of
the victim against the intentional actions of the rapist in assessing their respective
percentages of fault. See Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1428-31.
192 DOBBS, Supra note 134, at 503-06.
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scrupulously monitoring their daily behavior. 13In a path-breaking article
on the subject, Ellen Bublick gives the following rich description of the
tenor of the civil rape cases raising the victim fault defense:
The answer, from a broad swath of case law, seems to be that
almost any conduct by a woman (and the case law makes it clear
that it's a woman) may subject her to an unreasonable risk of rape.
According to the cases, a reasonable woman does not go outside
alone at night to hail a cab, or walk to her car in a hotel parking lot,
especially if a man is outside. She does not take four or five steps
inside the door before closing it. She double checks her door locks
and is certain that every widow is closed. She does not open the
door when someone knocks or invite a salesman into her home or a
man into her hotel room. She never drinks alcohol with a man,
particularly if he is older or streetwise or someone she has recently
met.
One thing we know quite clearly about the reasonable woman
from the case law: she is afraid-of going out, of letting someone
in, of rape. She is always on guard, and her fear of rape shapes every
aspect of her life and conduct.19
In the tort context, the issue of victim fault has proved vexing in
both stranger and acquaintance rape cases. Undoubtedly, the most
notorious stranger rape case is Wassell v. Adams, 9 5 authored by judge
Richard Posner. At issue was the behavior of a young woman who opened
the door of her hotel room to an intruder, mistakenly believing that her
ianc6 had arrived. She subsequently agreed to give the man a drink of
water when he requested it and was unable to escape when he brutally
attacked her.9r The jury evidently believed that the young woman was
largely responsible for the rape: they assigned 97% fault to her,
compared to only 3% to the motel for failing to warn the plaintiff of the
dangerous character of the neighborhood or to take other precautions to
197prevent the rape. judge Posner upheld the verdict, reasoning that a
warning would have done no good and that other precautionary
measures were too expensive. 9 8 He also speculated that, despite the jury's
finding of negligence, the jury might have believed that the motel was
not really negligent at all, apparently discounting evidence of a prior
rape, robbery and an incident in which an intruder had kicked in the
door to one of the motel rooms.O
In one respect, Wassell is an extreme case. It is rare to see such a
severe reduction of damages in a stranger rape case. More often, the
' See CHAmALLAs, supra note 85, at 228-31 (discussing causal attribution, victim
responsibility, and rape justification).
Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1432-33.
865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
9.. Id. at 851.
'~Id. at 852.
'~Id. at 855-56.
'~Id. at 852, 856.
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reductions are lower (although often sizeable), as exemplified by the
30% reduction in damages to a woman who was raped in New Orleans
when she went outside to hail a cab at 3:00 a.m., found no cabs available,
and discovered she had been locked out of her hotel . 1 In acquaintance
rape cases, however, there is a greater risk that juries will be especially
harsh and will express their moral disapproval of a plaintiff's conduct
through a severe reduction of damages or denial of recovery. In one
Ohio case, for example, a jury assigned 51 % fault to a victim of a violent
acquaintance rape when the victim had gone clubbing and drinking with
the rapist prior to the assaultIt. 211' Following the modified comparative fault
rule in force in ,hio the assignment had the effect of barring all
recovery.
The victim fault cases pose a special challenge in a torts system
committed to comparative fault. It should be remiemibered that, in all
cases, plaintiffs have the formidable task of first convincing the court that
the defendant had a duty to prevent the rape and that the defendant's
action or inaction caused the plaintiffs injury. Only after this burden is
met does the issue of the plaintiffs fault come into play. The most
controversial question posed by the victim fault cases is whether victims
and institutional defendants should be treated alike, presumably because
each actor had an opportunity to avert harm but negligently failed to do
so. The alternative to Such a symmetrical approach is to recognize
important differences in the situation of the two actors that justify
treating them differently; that is, to see a difference in failing to prevent
injury to oneself as opposed to others, to recognize the different kind of
costs that each actor pays for not being more cautious or prudent, and to
decide whether reducing or barring recovery for rape victims will likely
serve the social policy of curtailing high rates of sexual assaults.
The kind of gender-related concerns that arise in civil rape cases
would seem to call out for application of a reasonable woman standard to
assess victim fault. Particularly at this point in the litigation, it is
imperative that women's experiences with rape, the fear of rape, and
knowledge of cultural myths about rape be brought to bear on the
question. It is telling, however, that neither courts nor commentators
have urged reliance on the reasonable woman standard in this context.
" Storts v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. 983285, 98-3320, 2000 WAL 358381, at *2
(10th Cir., Apr. 6, 2000) (30% reduction); Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d
130, 132 (5th Cir. 1987). See also Kukla v. Syfus Leasing Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1328, 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (40% reduction); Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 651 So. 2d 911,
917 (La. App. 1995) (35% reduction).
201 Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott Ltd. P'ship, 659 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio
1996). See also Beni v. Asse Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 2000) (41%
reduction for rape of German exchange student by host "father"); Mar-tin v. Prime
Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (lholdinig that it
was an error not to allow evidence of victim's fault in drinking to excess to reduce
recovery).
202 Malone, 659 N.E.2d at 1242.
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Instead, the leading scholar in this area, Ellen Bublick, has taken a
different tack and has argued for a tort rule that would declare that
plaintiffs have "no duty" to protect themselves against rape .20Notably, in
this one specific context, taking the issue away from the jury is offered up
as the egalitarian solution which again fixes on duty.
The reasons for not embracing a reasonable woman standard to
address the problem of victim fault in civil rape cases are those
catalogued previously. The primary concern is that using a reasonable
woman standard in this context will likely trigger conventional, but
inegalitarian, attitudes towards women and will simply reinforce the
belief that women need to "restrict their conduct in ways that men do
not. ,2 04 When asked to judge how a reasonable woman would respond to
a risk of rape, both male and female jurors may conclude that she should
be more careful than a man under the circumstances, much in the same
way that some earlier juries believed that women should take more
precautions because of their frailty. Put another way, it may well be that
use of a reasonable woman standard would encourage juries to use a
double standard in evaluating the conduct of a rape victim. Bublick fears,
for example, that the reductions in recovery in civil rape cases stem from
"what is, in practice if not in theory, a reasonable woman standard. 2 0 5
The history of reform of criminal rape laws has shown that there is a
deep-seated cultural tendency for persons to focus on and to criticize the
actions of rape victims, a move that frequently deflects attention away
from the behavior of the defendant. In third-party rape cases, when the
jury is asked specifically to compare the actions of a rape victim and an
institutional actor, this cultural tendency to fix upon the victim may be
even harder to resist. It may not be enough that the very point of
permitting third-party actions is at odds with the notion that individual
victims are on their own and cannot expect others to take steps to protect
them. Because customary beliefs about women's responsibility to control
rape are so well entrenched, stronger medicine than using a perspectival
standard may be needed to protect against sexist judgments. As Mayo
Moran has suggested, in highly charged contexts such as third-party rape
cases, where "there is deeper tension between the legal and the
customary nom... it may be necessary to use specific provisions to
counteract the most prevalent discriminatory understandings and to
,,206draw attention to and try to rule out customary errors .
Bublick's recommendation to adopt a "no-duty" rule with respect to
victim fault is a good example of such a specific provision .2 It sends the
message that it is not unreasonable for women to venture into areas that
may pose a greater risk of rape for them than for most men and relieves
20. Bublick, Citizen N~o-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1416.
14Id. at 1461.
205 Id. at 1460.
"6MORAN, Supra note 40, at 15 (2003).
107 Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1416.
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persons generally of the obligation to take precautions against the risk of
sexual assault. As Bublick herself has recognized, labeling such a specific
rule a no-duty rule may be "infelicitious," insofar as it suggests that
plaintiffs no longer have to act reasonably. 0 It may be preferable to
regard the rule as an entitlement, given that the strongest reason for
adopting such a rule is to contest the conventional wisdom about what is
reasonable conduct and to assure that women are not required to order
and monitor their behavior based on a pervasive fear of rape.
The difficulties encountered with victim fault demonstrate that there
is no way to address the issue fairly without facing up to the systematic
gender inequality in our society. The no-duty rule declares, in effect, that
it is unjust to make women shoulder the burden of preventing their own
rapes and that every citizen, regardless of gender, "should be entitled to
shape her life around the assumption that others will not intentionally
rape her. 20 9 There is no denying that this cost-benefit analysis embodies a
normative judgment that clearly prioritizes gender equality and women's
physical safety over the interests of institutional defendants who facilitate
criminal acts by failing to take reasonable safety precautions. And, for this
reason, it is highly controversial. To date, the no-dlut ' approach has
received a favorable mention in the Restatement (Third), "'an important
development that might encourage future courts to adopt it. So far,
however, in the sexual context, a no-duty rule has been applied only in
cases involving sexual molestation of minors 2 1 ' a type of case where there
is far less inclination to blame the plaintiff and more cultural pressure to
find an avenue for redress. Whether the approach will be taken up in
cases of adult victims is an open question.
Finally, it should be noted that a no duty-rule also has the
considerable advantage of being framed in gender-neutral terms and
making clear that its protection extends to male victims of sexual assault
as well as to women. It thus avoids the difficulty of having to choose
among a reasonable man, a reasonable victim, or even a reasonable
woman standard in picking an appropriate perspectival standard for
cases involving male victims. It also prevents juries from faulting male
victims for not being strong enough to prevent their own victimization
"' Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REv. 977, 1037
(2003) [hereinafter Bublick, Comparative Fault] (quoting DOBBS, HAYDEN & BtJBLIcK,
supra note 162, at 272).
20' Btiblick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 15, at 1416.
210 RESTATEMENT (THi-RD) § 7 cmt. h ("Just as special problems of policy may
support a no-duty determination for a defendant, similar concerns may support a no-
duty determination for plaintiff negligence."). See alIso RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OFrLAILTY § I cmt. b, note (Proposed Final Draft 1998).
211 See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007); Christensen v. Royal Sch.
Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283 (Wash. 2005); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ,
890 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1995); Hutchinson ez ret. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 763 A.2d
826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). For a disctussion of cases involving minors, see Bublick,
Comparative Fault, supra note 208, at 1021.
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and from applying stereotyped beliefs that men do not suffer from
aggressive sexual behavior. Its main function can thus be seen as a
universal one of protecting the interest in sexual autonomy for both men
and women.
C. Race, Economic Status, and Criminal Attacks
We have seen that in third-party rape and sexual assault cases, courts
have sometimes considered the gender of the victims and have shown
some awareness that the duty rules they articulate-as they relate to the
conduct of both the defendant and the plaintiff-have important
implications for women's sexual autonomy and physical security. In third-
party criminal attack cases not involving sexual assaults, however, there
has been comparatively little appreciation for how judicial rulings on
duty might disparately affect minority groups or low-income
communities. In a few recent cases in which the interests of consumers
and residents have been mentioned, moreover, courts have uncritically
tended to accept the arguments of defendants that imposing tort liability
would not just be bad for the businesses sued but would also harm
residents in poorer communities. 1
In these third-party criminal attack cases, the primary issue is again
that of duty and the proper role of foreseeability in the duty analysis.
Many of these cases are brought by customers attacked in stores and
adjacent parking lots.2 13 Despite the existence of conditions that would
seem to pose an obvious danger to the shoppers, courts have generally
been reluctant to impose a duty that would require businesses to take
precautions against criminal attacks, particularly if the threat of liability
might mean that the business would be pressured into hiring security
214guards to patrol dangerous areas . For the most part, the cases stall out
on the threshold issue of defendants' duty, never reaching the issue of
the comparative fault of the plaintiffs. If the plaintiff does overcome the
duty obstacle, however, defendants have generally not attempted to limit
the plaintiffs recovery by invoking comparative fault.2 1 5' In contrast to the
sexual assault cases, there has been no argument, for example, that a
plaintiff was negligent in choosing to shop in an unsafe area.
One example is Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy 's Corner,1 a case decided in
1997 by the Washington Supreme Court in which a customer was brutally
2"2 See infra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
21See, eg., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 659 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
24 The precaution of hiring security guards is so prominent that these cases are
sometimes referred to as "negligent security" cases.
25See Lee, 659 S.E.2d at 907 (shopper recovered for being shot while her car was
taken at gunpoint in parking lot at 2:00 am.). But cf. Lannon v. Taco Bell, Inc., 708
P.2d 1370, 1370-73 (Colo. App. 1985) (approving comparative negligence
instruction where shopper called attention to himself and ran away from robbery in
progress).
216 943 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
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attacked in a parking lot of a 7-Eleven store after he refused to buy beer
for youths who approached him. The plaintiff produced evidence that
the parking lot had been used for years as a place to gather and drink.
On some occasions, as many as 100 young men would congregate in the
117
parking lot, and fights sometimes broke out. In the past, store clerks
had been verbally assaulted and were well aware of the problems of
loitering, drinking, and fighting on the premises . Prior to the attack on
Nivens, however, no customer of the 7-Eleven store had been assaulted .
From the facts, one might have expected that a core issue in the case
would be whether the court would insist on proof of prior similar or
identical crimes or would instead be willing to find foreseeability and
impose a duty based on the existence of the threatening conditions-
short of a prior attack-that could escalate into violence. Indeed, the
intermediate appellate court ruled for the defendant on this ground,
declaring that no reasonable juror could conclude that the loitering
teens presented a foreseeable risk of an attack on a shopper. 2 2 0 In
addition to the foreseeability analysis, however, both the trial court and
the Washington Supreme Court also relied on a public policy argument
that cut sharply against liability and seemed to question the viability of
third-party suits altogether.
The defense strategy, which proved to be successful in Nivens, was to
frame the contested issue narrowly.2 1 The contest became whether the
defendant owed a specific affirmative duty to provide armed security
guards rather than whether it had a general duty to act reasonably to
222prevent injury to its customers. Once the court accepted the narrow
framing of the case, it had little trouble concluding that no such specific
duty existed and accordingly excluded plaintiff's evidence that other 7-
Eleven stores in nearby communities had hired security guards to address
223
similar loitering problems. When the case reached the Washington
Supreme Court, a divided court also framned the issue narrowly as a
dispute over the hiring of armed security guards and upheld summary
judgment for the defendan t.22
The court's refusal to entertain the notion that the defendant's duty
to deter attacks might re~asonably extend to the provision of armed
security guards rested on the belief that providing such security was
217 Id. at 288.
218 Id. at 295 (SandersJ, dissenting).
211 Id. at 288.
220 Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Corner, 920 P.2d 241, 250-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting a "dearth of evidence to support a finding that a reasonable person would
have foreseen violence of the general type that occurred here").
221 Id. at 244.
22 Id. at 244-47.
22Nivens, 943 P.2d at 288, 295 (SandersJ, dissenting).
121 Id. at 293-94. See also Maysonet v. KFC, Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931-32
(2d Cir. 1990) (no duty to customer stabbed by harassing loiterer while standing in
line at KFC in the South Bronx).
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"essentially a duty to provide police protection" that was "vested in the
government by constitution and statute, ,25rather than inprivate parties.
By the court's logic, imposing such a duty would be unfair and
disproportionate, reasoning that the defendant would then be required
"to provide a safer environment on his premises than his invitees would
encounter in the community at large . 2 In the court's estimation, even if
the police were unable to deter crime in the community, businesses
227
should not have to fill in the gap. In a statement that now seems
outdated in light of the contemporary gun rights movement, the court
was of the view that to "shift the duty of police protection from the
government to the private sector would amount to advocating that
members of the public resort to self-help" 2  a proposition the court
regarded as clearly against public policy.
The public policy argument against requiring security guards had
first been articulated in Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.,'2 a suit
involving the shooting of a customer in a Detroit drug store located in a
high-crime area. The opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court denying
liability depicted shopkeepers as helpless to protect customers, declaring
that "W oday a crime may be committed anywhere and at any time" and
that a shopkeeper "cannot control the incidence of crime in the
community., 2 'g The court downplayed the fact that, prior to the attack,
the drug store in question had employed a plainclothes, unarmed
security guard to protect the store's assets and to summon medical
assistance in emergencies: On the day of the shooting, however, the
guard was sick, and the main office failed to supply a substitute.
Although the Court's "no duty" conclusion prevented the plaintiff
from even reaching the issue of whether the drug store had unreasonably
failed to take precautions to protect its customers, it nevertheless
declared that the shopkeeper was as much of an "innocent victim" of
crime as the injured customer, 23 displaying a deep-seated hostility toward
third-party criminal attack claims generally. Other courts have echoed
these sentiments, characterizing the third-party claim as a broad attempt
to shift responsibility for police protection from the government to the
private sector anid as imposing limitless demands on business . 2 3 3 The




228 418 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1988).
211 Id. at 384.
211 Id. at 382-85.
212 Id. at 385 n.19 ("shifting the financial loss caused by crime from one innocent
victim to another is improper" (citation omitted)).
231 See Boren v. Worthen Nat'l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 941 (Ark. 1996).
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opinions create the impression that crime is endemic, unforeseeable, and
nearly impossible to guard against.23
This image of crime as endemic and random, however, masks the
reality that different communities have very different rates of crime and
that criminal attacks are thus far more likely to occur in some
neighborhoods than in others. 3 Although it may be difficult to predict
with any precision when and where a given crime will occur, a
shopkeeper in a "high crime"1 area 236 surely has good reason to suspect
that its business might be targeted and would be hard-pressed to assert
that an attack on one of its customers is truly unforeseeable, in the sense
that it is difficult to imagine such an event taking place. In fact, the
notion that crime is simultaneously both endemic and random is
contradictory and likely built upon the false assumption that an event is
unforeseeable unless the details of the occurrence and its timing are
predictable, a very strict notion of foreseeability that finds little support
in tort law.23
Moreover, it is well known that high-crime areas are most likely to be
populated by low-income residents, a disproportionate number of whom
are racial and ethnic minorities. Racial and ethnic segregation of
communities is still pervasive in the United States, in both the inner city,
and more recently, moving into the "inner-ring" of the suburbs located
near large metropolitan areas. "In 2000, nearly three out of four people
living in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty were black or Latino . 3
Most importantly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that "crime rates,
especially for violent crime, are particularly high in areas of concentrated
'"See Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (N.J. 1962) (" [B] ut
how can one know what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict,
the degenerate, the psychopath and the psychotic?").
21 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'v REv.
53, 82-83 (2003) ("[Cllrime tends to cluster in discrete geographic areas and is
relatively stable within those areas.").
2" There is no uniform definition of a high-crime area, despite the recent
availability of crime mapping software and crime pattern analysis that can be used to
compare the incidence of criminal activity in different geographic locations. See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The 'High-Crime Area" Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantfiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion
Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. REV. 1587, 1593-95 (2008). In tort cases, expert witnesses are
often used to establish the high-crime nature of the area in which the attack took
place. See, eg., Henry v. Parish of Jefferson, 835 So. 2d 912, 918 (La. Ct. App. 2002);
Simpson v. Boyd, 880 So. 2d 1047, 1052 (Miss. 2004).
237 Courts generally require only that the general character of an event or harm
be foreseeable, not its precise nature or manner of occurrence. See, eg., Marshall v.
Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (111. 2006); Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983).
2john a. powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act
at 40, 18 J. ArronABsLE HOUSING & COMMUNnY DEv. 145, 148 (2009) (explaining that
concentrated poverty neighborhoods have more than 40% of the population living in
poverty).
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poverty." 39 The risks of criminal attacks thus do not fall evenly among the
members of society, but are one of the heightened risks experienced by
residents of the inner city and other high-crime neighborhoods with high
concentrations of minorities. It is important to recognize that these risks
are not ones that residents of the community have freely accepted or
which can fairly be attributed to individual choice. Instead, studies
investigyating the causes of racial segregation have emphasized that laws
and public policies-including racially restricted covenants, restrictions
on federal subsidized mortgages, redlining, and steering-have played a
prominent role in producing the "racialized spaces" that characterize
U.S. cities and suburbs.'4 It is these structural factors, rather than the
"irremediable consequence of purely private or individual choices, 2 4'
that make residence in a high-crime community a matter largely beyond
individual control and not so dissimilar to "immutable" factors such as
race and gender.
Given the weakness of the lack-offoreseeability argument for
denying a duty in third-party tort cases in high-crime neighborhoods, it is
not surprising that some courts have also based their no-duty decisions
on the public policy argument that preventing crime is solely a duty
assigned to the police, rather than to private entities. 2 4 2 Indeed, the
emphasis in these cases on the lack of a shopkeeper's duty to provide
armed security guards seems largely to perform the rhetorical function of
"proving" that such a duty is quintessentially a public one performed by a
police officer, by conjuring up an image of an armed policeman, despite
243the widespread use of private security forces by businesses.
It is significant that the "no-duty-to-provide-police-protection"
argument goes against allowing any claim in third-party attack cases, not
simply cases involving the failure to provide armed security guards. There
is no good reason, for example, why providing adequate lighting in a
privately-owned parking lot to prevent crime should be considered a
private function, while providing a security guard to prevent crime in the
same location is regarded as a public function. Because only private
landowners have the authority and the choice to take such preventive
measures on their own propety,2 each measure should be
acknowledged as privately available and to that degree considered a
private function. As a categorical argument, the public/private
239 Rosenthal, supra note 235, at 82.
240 See DouGLAs S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
241 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITNGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
449,450 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
212 See Boren v. Worthen Nat'l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 941 (Ark. 1996).
243 See id.
244 The duty issue is more complicated if the attack takes place on public
property adjacent to the defendant's business. See, eg., Rhudy v. Bottlecaps Inc., 830
A.2d 402, 406-07 (Del. 2003).
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distinction disintegrates rapidly and can easily be detected as masking a
policy dispute. Lastly, it is doubtful that many courts today would claim
that it is against public policy to create incentives for private husiness
owners to employ armed security guards based on the view that only the
police should carry guns . Instead, the success of gun rights advocates in
pressing for legislation and judicial rulings allowing private citizens to
own and carry weapons underscores a societal willingness to enlist private
persons to fight crime.
The argument that the duty to prevent crime is solely a police
function is particularly harsh on plaintiffs given the current state of the
law regarding tort suits against public entities. The chances of prevailing
against a municipality for inadequate police protection under either tort
law or a civil rights statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are exceedingly
246
small . On the torts front, the "public duty doctrine" which maintains
that a municipality's duty to provide police protection is owed only to the
public at large and not to any specific individual is still the mnajority
rule: Moreover, since the landmark cases of Washington v. Davis and
249DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Public Service, to prevail in a
§ 1983 failure-to-protect case, plaintiffs must prove that the municipality
or other governmental body purposefully denied them adequate police
protection because of their race, gender, or other group-based
characteristic. In most criminal attack cases, plaintiffs will at best be able
to prove negligence and wvill rarely have sufficient evidence of purposeful
discrimination or deliberate indifference to rise to the level of a civil
rights violation. It is thus fair to conclude that the extremely high
thresholds of proof-in both torts and civil rights-have virtually
eliminated the option of suing the police for injuries from criminal
attacks, except in extremely rare instances in which the police have
promised or undertaken special protection to a specific individual in
11 But see Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 53 (Colo. 1987) (Erickson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that presence of firearms increases the risk of injury).
246 See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
17See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that the
public duty doctrine defeats a claim asserting that police negligently failed to arrest
drunk driver who caused subsequent accident); Cuffy v. City of N.Y., 505 N.E.2d 937,
940 (N.Y. 1987) (explaining that a public duty rule governs unless agents of
municipality through direct contact with plaintiff promised to provide protection).
24. 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976) (showing of purposeful discrimination required
to maintain equal protection claim).
249 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (holding that there was no constitutional violation
for failing to remove abused boy from custody of his father, despite recurring signs of
abuse). See also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding
that there was no constitutional violation for failing to enforce a domestic abuse
restraining order). See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms,
and the Due Process Clause, 94 MicH. L. Rrv. 982, 983 (1996) (discussing reluctance to
provide a remedy against government in failure-to-protect cases).
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2501
advance of the attack . In the current legal environment, taking the
position that preventing crime is solely a public police function means
that crime victims will likely have no avenue of compensation, save a suit
against the assailant.25
The third-party tort claims against businesses thus emerge as the
primary arena in which the courts must decide whether to prioritize the
safety and compensation interests of local consumers and residents over
the economic interests of shopkeepers and other business entities.
Simply put, imposing a duty to exercise reasonable care affords plaintiffs
an opportunity to receive compensation and increases the incentives on
businesses to make shopping and other daily activities in high-crime
communities safer. No-duty rules, in contrast, prioritize the economic
interests of businesses through tort immunity, denying compensation to
victims and taking away incentives for local businesses to invest in safety.
To avoid addressing this direct clash of interests, however, in some
recent cases defendants have offered an additional "public policy"
argument aimed at conflating the interests of residents, consumers, and
busineses an maki gitapear that imposing tort liability actually hurts
low-income communities. As articulated most fully by the Pacific Legal
Foundation,'5 a right-wing interest group which opposes third-party
litigation,'5 the interests of low-income consumers and residents of high-
crime communities are best served by denying tort recovery. Noting that
'Judicial requirements of additional security always have the greatest
impact in low-income, high-crime areas,",5 an attorney for the Pacific
Legal Foundation asks a series of rhetorical questions designed to raise
the specter of tort liability forcing businesses to relocate out of high-
crime communities, leaving low-income and minority residents without
needed goods and services:
Since protection costs money, how would a business
250 See, e.g., Beal v. City of Seattle, 954 P.2d 237, 246 (Wash. 1998) (finding
liability when there was direct contact between police and victim and reliance by
victim of express assurances of police assistance).
2In some circumstances, the victim of crime may also be able to obtain some
compensation through a state victim compensation fund. However, various
restrictions on eligibility have reduced the effectiveness of victim compensation funds
as a source of financial protection for victims of sexual assault. See Ilene Seidman &
Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform,
38 SurroLK U. L.REv. 467, 481 (2005) (noting that victim compensation statutes are
useless to many victims because of their tie to the criminal justice process).
212 See infra text accompanying note 258.
253 Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners' Duty to Prevent Criminal
Acts on the Premises, 28 WHrITIER L. Rrv. 409 (2006) (arguing that imposing liability
hurts low-income communities).
254 The Pacific Legal Foundation describes part of their mission as defending the
"human right of private property" and as protecting "businesses against unfair
burdens." See About PLE, PAc. LEGAL FOUND., http://community.pacificlegal.org/
Page.aspx?pid=262.
255 La Fetra, supra note 253, at 460.
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operating on a small profit margin fulfill its obligation in a
high-crime area? If business owners absorb the high cost of
protection by raising the price of their goods and services,
how will the poor (who most often reside in areas where the
incidence of crime is greatest) be able to meet their basic
needs given the minimal financial resources available to
them? In all practicality, would they not be singled out as
the ones to pay for their own police protection? Would it
not be more economical for businesses to close their doors
and relocate to "safer ground"? If so, how Would indigent
members of that community who lack the adequate means
of transportation be able to obtain needed goods and
services?
Businesses can only absorb a certain amount of additional cost
before passing those costs onto the customers they serve. If the
goods are too high-priced, they will not sell and the business will
close. Or if the business decides that it cannot recoup its costs, then
it simply will find another location where the clientele can afford
the higher prices.25
The upshot of this argument is to convince courts that it is futile to
try to use tort law to deter criminal attacks and that the best that can be
done is to try to prevent businesses from leaving low-income
neighborhoods by immunizing them from tort liability. A few courts have
accepted this argument and based their no-duty rulings on speculation
that imposing tort liability would ultimately harm resideints and
25i7
consumers in low-income areas. One Louisiana court, for example,
broadly stated that:
The more the courts try to off-load the sovereign's responsibility for
random third-party criminal acts onto neighborhood businesses,
the harder it will be to induce providers of basic services such as
grocery stores and pharmacies to locate in high crime areas; and
those that do so must then compensate by charging more to offset
the added insurance and security expenses. This contributes to the
well known fact that residents in poverty areas, which are normally
26Id. at 460-61 (quoting Sigfredo A. Cabrera, Negligence Liability of Landowners
and Occupiers for the Criminal Conduct of Another: On a Clear Day in California One Can
Foresee Forever, 23 CAL..W. L. REV. 165, 188 (1987) (footnote omnitted)).
25 See Stafford v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) ("To hold restaurant owners responsible for providing police protection
against the criminal conduct of third parties . .. especially those in 'high crime' areas,
may drive businesses out of those neighborhoods."); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
752 So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999) ("Security is a significant monetary expense for any
btisiness and further increases the cost of doing business in high crime areas that are
already economically depressed."); and Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821, 827 (W.
Va. 1995) (Denying liability for attack in mobile home park because "[plroviding
security to tenants costs money, and some tenants would not be able to afford the
rent a landlord would have to charge to provide security in high crime areas. The
result would be that low,%-income persons many find themselves without any
housing.").
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also the areas of the highest crime, tend to pay a premium for
essential services in spite of the fact that they are the least able to
258pay.
The flaw in the public policy argument that presumes that imposing
tort liability is bad for residents in affected communities, however, is that
it draws a straight line from imposing a duty on a particular business to
the closing of that business or to substantial price increases in the
products which the business sells, without seriously considering the
impact of liability insurance on this equation. There is, however, no such
direct causal chain. Instead, as insurance scholar Tom Baker reminds us,
the existence of liability insurance "shifts the liability of the particular
defendant to an entity for which that liability is simpl Y one among an
enormous portfolio of contingent financial obligations." 59 For third-party
criminal attack claims based on negligence-rather than on an
intentional tort theory -businesses are often able to obtain coverage
for losses due to criminal attacks as part of their Commercial General
Liability policy. Except in those specific instances in which policy
exclusions for harm "arising out of an assault and battery" have been
construed to deny coverage to taverns, restaurants, and other businesses
where alcoholic beverages are served,26 commercial establishments are
able to plan for and protect against losses stemming from robberies and
other criminal activities.
Indeed, this ability to shift and spread losses through insurance has
contributed to the rise of the so-called enabling torts, 6 such as the third-
party criminal attack claim, under the recognition that compensation can
best be secured by imposing a duty beyond the criminal wrongdoer. In
his history of liability insurance, Kenneth Abraham explains the
insurance logic behind the third-party claim:
Liability has sometimes been imposed on what might be called
secondary wrongdoers at least in part because principal wrongdoers
in certain settings are likely to be uninsured or underinsured....
Relaxation of the no-duty rules in such situations holds a secondary
258 Thompson v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 812 So. 2d 829, 832 (La. Ct. App. 2002). See
also Stafford, 629 F. Supp. at 11I10.
259 Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance
Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 9 (2005).
260 Liability insurance policies frequently contain an exclusion for intentional
torts committed by the insured. However, the "moral hazard" problem often cited in
support of the intentional torts exclusion has no relevance in third-party claims based
on negligence. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crimte Bounday, in FAULT
LINES: TORT LAW As CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 72-73 (David M. Engel & Michael
McCann eds., 2009) (criticizing moral hazard argument for intentional torts
exclusion).
"'See David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, 11, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A
Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 857, 882-83 (2001) (discussing exclusion for
harm 'arising out of an assault and battery").
262 The term comes from Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435,
436 (1999).
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wrongdoer. .. liable for the consequences of the principal
wrongdoer's action. In many of these enabling torts the secondary
wrongdoer is a socially and economically more responsible
individual or enterprise that is far more likely to have liability
insurance, and to be covered by that insurance because an
intentional-injury exclusion in the policy is inapplicable to a claim
for coverage of negligent enabling, than the principal wrongdoer.
The expansion of liability for certain enabling torts takes advantage
of liability insurance covering categories of actors who previously
were protected by a no-duty rule .2
Thus, although there can be no guarantee that imposing tort liability will
never result in the closing of a vital business or a devastating price hike,
such an impact cannot be presumed, particularly with respect to larger
enterprises that carry insurance and have the capacity to manage and
spread costs among their various stores and enterprises.
The Catch-22 aspect of the pro-defendant, no-duty rulings,
moreover, is that plaintiffs who seek to prove that the attack upon them
was foreseeable, by showing the high-crime nature of the area where the
crime occurred, run headlong into the public Volicy argument that
imposing tort liability in such areas is undesirable . This is because the
perceived public policy that claims to "facilitate private enterprise even in
high-crime areas"6 is fundamentally at odds with the general negligence
principle that the degree of care required should be commensurate to
the risk. When the duty issue is governed by public policy judgments,
rather than by foreseeability, political questions about which direction
tort policies should take come more sharply into focus.
The balancing of costs and benefits embedded in defendants'
arguments that tort liability hurts low-income communities is lopsided
and fails to consider whether there is a distinct public policy to be served
by encouraging businesses to reduce crime in low-income, high-crime
neighborhoods. A very different public policy argument can be seen in
some cases-mostly of an earlier vintage-which refused to presume that
imposing tort liability would force businesses to relocate or that
spreading the costs of attacks among local consumers would severely
undermine the economic health of low-income communities. Thus, the
Supreme Court of Colorado had little difficulty imposing a duty on a
2" KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILrty CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAw FROM
'IHE PROGIRESWEv ERA T1O 9/11 196 (2008).
2"See, eg., Papadimas v. Mykonos Lounge, 439 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) ("Although crime occurs more frequently in certain areas of our cities and
particular portions of the state, we again decline to apply a higher standard of duty is
such so-called high crime areas.").
215 Williams v. Nevel's-Jarrett Assocs., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
2 See, eg., Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 49-50 (Colo. 1987) (holding
that providing reasonable protections against third party attacks is relatively
inexpensive and therefore not an onerous burden).
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Taco Bell located in a high-crime community in Denver, stating that it
was:
not unfair that patrons pay a few cents more for items they
purchase from such a store and gain the assurance of reasonable
protection against criminal activity by shopping there, rather than
allow the emotional and physical burden of a criminal attack to fall
on the store patron who inadvertently finds himself or herself in the
middle of a robbery invited by the store's failure to employ minimal
crime deterrence measures.26
One good recent example of a court concluding that public policy
cuts in favor of imposing a duty comes from the Supreme Court of
Connecticut in Monk v. Temple George Associates,2" a case involving a
woman who was attacked in a parking lot of a nightclub in New Haven.
For this court, the fact that the nightclub was located in a high-crime area
served to increase the precautions that the owner should take to prevent
crimes on the nightclub's premises, not to decrease them .26The court
concluded that imposing tort liability would serve the public policy of
"promot~ing] business activity in Connecticut cities," that it would not be
likely to dampen business, and that the "the benefits of reasonable
security probably would outweigh the burden of a marginal increase in
parking costs for most customers. 2 7 0 Rather than assume that tort liability
would force the nightclub to close or relocate, the court concluded that
increasing safety might be economically beneficial to the surrounding
community in the long run because "more people would be likely to
drive into the city if the parking lots located there were safer."
27
'
The Connecticut Supreme Court's approach in Monk demonstrates
that economic analysis-or economic speculation-in third-party tort
cases need not invariably cut in favor of the defendant. Whether
imposing tort liability in low-income communities will be good or bad for
the local economy is an empirical question that crucially depends on the
specific local conditions, the particular businesses affected, and the
actual (rather than threatened) response of businesses to the imposition
of tort liability. It is also the kind of complex, intractable empirical
question that will likely remain unanswered, even if disinterested
researchers were to decide to take up the issue. As a result, the "public
policy" approach to duty in these third-party criminal attack cases can be
counted on to yield indeterminate results, often reflecting the courts'
shifting political inclinations to side with either tort plaintiffs or
institutional defendants.
17Id. (quoting Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572. 579 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984)). See also Isaacs v. Htuntington Memn'l Hosp., 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 360-61 (Cal.
1985).
'8869 A.2d 179, 182 (Conn. 2005).
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What seems to be missing from the judicial framing of the
competing interests at stake in third-party criminal attack cases, however,
is an appreciation for the equality interests of low-income and minority
plaintiffs and local residents, aside from economic conditions affecting
their communities. Significantly, in the third-party rape and sexual
assault cases, some courts and commentators have reasoned that if
women are disproportionately subjected to the risk of sexual assault, it is
only fair to set the level of care at a standard that provides equal safety for
women as well as men, presumably even if such response requires
additional expenditures . In other words, gender equity in this context
requires equal regard for the physical security of women even when
women are not similarly situated to men. I detect no similar equality
concern for the physical security of racial and ethnic minorities and low-
income residents. Notably, courts and commentators have not yet
discussed whether imposing a duty to protect against criminal attacks
furthers an "equal right" to safety for persons who live in high-crime
neighborhoods. Nor is there recognition that racial and class-based
equity in this context requires businesses to take precautions
proportionate to the risks, even if that entails greater expenditures for
crime prevention in some neighborhoods. Crucially, what is missing from
the rhetoric of thejudicial decisions is the sense that it is unfair to subject
some groups of citizens to greater physical risks simply because of where
they live.
Even progressive courts such ats the Coninecticut Suprenme Court in
Monk seem to shy away from discussing race and identifying racial
equality as one of the interests at stake in third-party criminal attack
cases. 23Instead, the trend is to ignore race and class or to conflate the
interests of racial minorities and low-income residents with that of
business. This move, however, does not prevent the decisions from
having a racial and class-based impact. Instead, insofar as courts accept
that businesses in high-crime neighborhoods have no duty to prevent
crime on their premises, they tacitly support race and class-based
inequalities by reinforcing and even magnifying disparities between high-
crime and safe neighborhoods and between minority and white
communities.
Underneath the courts' reluctance to declare that residents of high-
crime communities have a right to expect businesses to take reasonable
precautions proportionate to the risks may be the unspoken belief that
crime in poor, minority communities is natural or inevitable and not the
kind of problem redressable through the torts system. Research in
cognitive psychology has shown that racial stereotypes and entrenched
ideas about the likelihood of suffering experienced by members of
different social groups can affect everyday judgments about cause and
27' See cases cited supra notes 141, 152.
..See Monk, 869 A.2d at 187.
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responsibili ty. 2 7 4 Because we have come to expect hardship and suffering
in low-income minority communities, we may find it harder to imagine
negative events turning out differently and find it easier to accept
defense arguments that cast businesses as "innocent victims" who are
275powerless to alter the status quo. This ingrained tendency to regard
crime and personal injury as part and parcel of daily life in "racialized
spaces" is the backdrop against which plaintiffs must assert their
arguments for imposing tort duties, in the hope of encouraging courts
andjuries to imagine the possibility of a safer and improved community.
At bottom, the debate over duty is a debate over who will be the
decision-maker-the judge or the jury. And, as discussed earlier, it is at
this point that perspective comes into play. Recognizing that there are
equality interests at stake in third-party criminal attack cases helps to
identify this type of litigation as a special context in which "culturally
polarized understandings of fact" linked to the race and class of the
decision-maker is likely to emerge, much like the case of the high-speed
police chase decided by U.S. Supreme Court.2176 Sending such cases to the
jury has the advantage of increasing the chances that "someone like" the
plaintiff-reflecting the diversity of perspectives of residents in the local
community-will play a role in determining the level of reasonable care
for that community. It also gives a voice to local residents in making the
hard tradeoffs between greater safety on the one hand and possible
increases in prices and availability of services in high-crime communities
on the other hand. Applying a no-duty rule undoubtedly produces more
certain results, but has the decidedly negative effect of declaring, once
and for all, whose perspective shall govern.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the prominence of the objective RPS in both black letter tort
law and torts folklore, it is a mistake to conclude that contemporary tort
law is unaffected by perspective or that cultural debates about the
content of reasonableness and due care have not also played out in the
torts arena. To be sure, there has been little appetite for adoption of
explicit perspectival standards, such as the reasonable woman standard,
and even progressive scholars generally conclude that such a change
would not likely shape the law in an egalitarian direction. Instead, the
contests have been over whether to impose a duty in contexts that involve
"culturally polarized understandings of fact" and differing judgments
... See Ann L. McGill & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Mutability and Propensity in Causal
Selection, 79 J. PERSONAITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 677, 678-79 (2000); Robert A. Prentice &
Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making 88 CORNELL L. REv. 583,
595 (2003).
275 See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION By DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE
85 (2006).
... See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (2007).
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about reasonable expectations and reasonably safe behavior. As in many
other areas of law, the key issue often boils down to whether to send a
particular case or issue to thejury.
An examination of third-party criminal attack cases-a context of
special importance to women, racial minorities, and low-income
plain tiffs-reveals a lack of consensus as to whether commercial and
institutional defendants must take reasonable measures to guard against
crime on their premises. The chaos in the law reflects the degree of
cultural struggle. Particularly in sexual attack cases, some courts have
imposed a duty and have begun to articulate a norm of reasonable care
that takes into account women's disproportionate vulnerability to rape
and sexual assault, requiring defendants to make their premises equally
safe for men and women. Many other courts, however, have enlisted a
variety of rationales-lack of foreseeability, the random yet endemic
nature of crime, the public nature of police protection, and economic
hardship to defendants and local communities-to cut off duty and keep
these cases from the jury. Moreover, in cases arising in inner city and
other high-crime communities, there is little acknowledgment that crime
in such areas disproportionately affects minorities and low-income
persons and no articulation of a norm of equal safety regardless of where
a person resides. The notion that it is reasonable to require businesses in
high-crime areas to take precautions proportionate to the risk has not yet
taken hold.
In this Article, I have applied insights and findings from critical
theory and social science research to underscore the importance of
perspective in human decision-making and to build a case for imposing a
duty in third-party criminal attack cases. The research has shown that in
certain race and gender-salient contexts, perspective does indeed matter.
It points to the value of allowing the jury, as the most representative body
in the civil process, to have a role in determining and applying norms of
reasonableness and due care. My arguments generally align with the
recent position taken by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which rejects
using foreseeability to limit duty in third-party negligence cases and
recognizes that duty questions fundamentally implicate public policy.
The all-important question is whether courts will embrace progressive
public policies with a goal of providing an equal measure of physical
security to vulnerable groups or whether courts will decide to adopt
conservative public policies which limit the financial obligations of
businesses and allow them to operate without fear of tort liability.
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that imposing a duty
does not always promote egalitarian interests. In third-party rape and
sexual assault cases, the imposition of a duty on victims to prevent their
own assaults serves mainly to reinforce sexist notions that women are
responsible for their own victimization and that they should he faulted
for not curtailing their daily activities to guard against the pervasive
reality and fear of rape. In this one context, the case law has
demonstrated that juries too readily apply conventional, but
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inegalitarian, attitudes towards women, "split the baby" by declaring that
both the defendant and the plaintiff are at fault, and unjustifiably reduce
or deny recovery for sexual assault victims. Tellingly, in non-sexual assault
cases, there has been no similar inclination to place comparative
responsibility on crime victims once a duty on an institutional defendant
is imposed. Apparently, when it comes to matters of sex, the inclination
to blame the victim is just too deeply embedded to expect that female
representation on the jury alone will counter the ever-resilient sexual
double standard. The strong medicine of a no-duty rule that prioritizes
women's interests in physical safety and mobility and eliminates
comparative fault in rape and sexual assault cases thus seems to be in
order.
